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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 26 MARCH 1975 NUMBER 5
ELEMENTS OF RECOVERY UNDER RULE
10b-5: SCIENTER, RELIANCE, AND
PLAINTIFF'S REASONABLE CONDUCT
REQUIREMENT
RUTHEFORD B. CAMPBELL, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
A comparison of the commentaries on rule 10b-5' indicates
that uncertainty is widespread in this area of securities law. One
area that is needlessly confused is the proper selection and defini-
tion of those elements necessary for recovery in a 10b-5 action.
The purpose of this article is to consider four distinct elements
that continue to be the source of constant litigation and comment
and to suggest an approach that clarifies their meaning and use.
The four elements are: (1) scienter (the defendant's state of
mind), (2) reliance, (3) justifiable reliance, and (4) materiality.
This article will analyze the use of these elements in determining
liability for violations of rule 10b-5 in the context of four recurring
factual patterns: (1) face-to-face misstatement situations, (2)
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, School of Law; A.B., Centre
College, 1966; J.D., University of Kentucky, 1969; LL.M., Harvard University, 1971.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Larry E. Davis for his valuable
assistance in the preparation of this article while he was a third year student at the
University of South Carolina Law Center.
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973) rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
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face-to-face nondisclosure situations, (3) non-privity misstate-
ment situations, and (4) non-privity nondisclosure situations.2
The thesis of this article is that the configuration of elements
required to establish liability under 10b-5 need not be the same
in each factual situation. Rather, the elements of recovery should
be selected and defined in a manner that will further such sound
policies as the integrity of the securities market and fairness
among the parties. Fairness dictates that the loss resulting from
a securities transaction should be borne by the more blameworthy
party. If the parties are equally blameworthy, the law should not
reapportion the loss. The promotion of integrity in the securities
market' requires that the elements be defined in such a way as
both to encourage the disclosure of material information needed
for an informed investment decision and to discourage the use of
misstatements and manipulative devices in stock transactions.'
The furtherance of these policies may be thwarted if rigidity of
definition is demanded by the courts.
II. FACE-To-FACE TRANSACTIONS: MISSTATEMENTS AND
NONDISCLOSURES
An appropriate starting point is to define the terms "face-to-
face misstatement" and "face-to-face nondisclosure." A face-to-
face misstatement arises where a seller of securities (defendant)
sells a security to a purchaser (plaintiff) and in the course of the
transaction makes a misstatement to that purchasen, This type
of transaction is clearly subject to the constraints of rule 10b-5.
The sale of a security by the defendant to the plaintiff where
2. Each factual situation is defined more fully at the beginning of each section.
3. For a discussion of the purposes of the fraud provisions of the securities acts see
Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of
the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1274-76 (1965). "[I]t must be
remembered that the broader concern for the integrity of securities markets is the domi-
nant policy theme." Id. at 1275. For a discussion of the purposes of section 10(b), see
Landy v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 157 (3d Cir. 1973) (stating that
"[§ 10(b)'s] immediate concern was the protection of the purity of the informational
system in the securities market.").
4. See Schwartz, Book Review, 54 VA. L. Rav. 569, 571-72 (1968).
5. Included in this category is the "half-truth" situation, as covered in rule 1Ob-5(b).
Subsection 5(b) makes it unlawful "to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading. . . ." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1973).
6. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811, reh. denied, 382 U.S. 933 (1965).
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defendant fails to disclose to the plaintiff a fact relevant to the
transaction would constitute a face-to-face nondisclosure. This
transaction is also subject to the constraints of rule 10b-5.1
Although face-to-face misstatements and nondisclosures
have been held to be actionable in certain situations, a determi-
nation of liability in any given situation must be made with refer-
ence to the four elements previously mentioned. The remainder
of this section will define those elements and describe how they
should affect recovery.
A. Scienter
1. Face-To-Face Misstatement
"Scienter" is a term used to describe the state of mind of a
defendant in a 10b-5 suit.8 Relying primarily on an article by
Dean Keeton,' commentators have described five possible types
of conduct and states of mind of a defendant in a 10b-5 suit:'0
7. See, e.g., Stier v. Smith, 473 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1973).
8. More than any other element, the defendant's state of mind has been the subject
of comment by writers. See, e.g., Epstein, The Scienter Requirement in Actions Under
Rule 10b-5, 48 N.C.L. REv. 482 (1970); Note, The Role of Scienter and the Need to Limit
Damages in Rule 10b-5 Actions-The Texas Gulf Sulphur Litigation, 59 Ky. L.J. 891
(1971).
9. Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 583
(1958).
10. Epstein, The Scienter Requirement in Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 48 N.C.L. REv.
482, 483 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Epstein]; Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 1~b-5, 67 Nw.
U.L. REv. 562, 567-71 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Bucklo].
In her article, Bucklo explains the five levels of conduct with an example. A company
that has just acquired a patent on a material similar to fiberglass issues a press release
stating that the material is superior to other material used in molded equipment. In fact,
it was inferior, and the company goes broke. The author then states:
The defendants' degrees of knowledge and state of mind at the time the shares
were sold to the public could be any of the following:
1. They could have been convinced that the material was strong and
durable, based on their attorney's statements regarding testing by a mar-
ket research firm, and on successful first-year production [innocent be-
havior].
2. They could have believed in the superiority of the material for their
uses, but may have known that these beliefs were based solely on the
original patentee's statements and their own initial success in experimen-
tal production [negligent behavior].
3. They might not have known whether the representations were true,
since they had not begun production or testing designed to discover
whether the material would be suitable or not [reckless behavior].
4. They could have known of the falsity of the statements but hoped
that, with additional experimentation, the material would be suitable for
656 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
(1) Innocent, non-negligent behavior. An example would be
the seller of a security making a misstatement based on a rea-
sonable belief that the statement is true."
(2) Negligent behavior. An example would be the seller mak-
ing a misstatement that he negligently or unreasonably believes
to be true.
(3) Reckless behavior. An example would be the seller making
a misstatement without any knowledge concerning the truth of
the statement.
(4) Actual knowledge. An example would be the seller making
a statement that he knows is false.
(5) Intent to defraud. An example would be the seller making
a statement that he knows is false and making it with the intent
to induce the buyer to purchase the security."
Although there is no absolute consistency,' 3 commentators have
their purposes [actual knowledge].
5. They could have known of the falsity of their statements and simply
intended to create a demand for the stock which would raise its market
value quickly, having no intention ever to market any of the products
described in the release [intent to defraud].
Id. at 568.
11. Two cases from the Ninth Circuit seemed to indicate that an innocent mis-
statement could be the basis for recovery under rule 10b-5. Royal Air Properties, Inc. v.
Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). A subse-
quent case, however, made it clear that the Ninth Circuit does not accept the notion that
there is liability in 10b-5 cases in the absence of fault. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th
Cir. 1974). Other than Ellis and Royal Air Properties, there is little support for liability
without at least negligence. See, e.g., 6 L. Loss, SEcuRrrms REGULATION 3377 (2d ed. 1960)
[hereinafter cited as L. Loss].
It should be noted, however, that there may be common law remedies available to
one who purchases or sells securities in reliance on an innocent misrepresentation. Such
a plaintiff may be entitled to either recission or damages. See W. PROSsER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF ToRs 710-14 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W. PaossEi].
12. There is no discussion in this article of the "intent to defraud" standard as a
prerequisite for recovery, since there is little, if any, support for the proposition that this
standard is a requisite state of mind for recovery under lOb.5. See 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURI-
TIES LAW § 8.45 (543), at 204.175 (1971) [hereinafter cited as A. BROMBERG]:
No 10b-5 decision squarely requires 'intent to deceive' or clearly equivalent
phrases. There are some dicta, some ambiguous statements and some holdings
that intent or knowledge (or recklessness) is necessary. Most of the cases are in
the lower courts.
For a good discussion and rejection of the intent to defraud standard, see Globus v. Law
Research Servs., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir.
1969). See also Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967).
13. See L. Loss, supra note 11, at 1432 (2d ed. 1961), wherein the author states that
scienter "has been variously defined to mean everything from knowing falsity with an
implication of mens rea, through the various gradations of recklessness, down to such non-
action as is virtually equivalent to negligence or even liability without fault .. ."
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generally defined "scienter" with reference to conduct that is
reckless, knowing or intentional." Thus, "scienter" has not been
used to describe conduct of a defendant that is innocent or merely
negligent.
One unresolved issue in the face-to-face misstatement situa-
tion is whether scienter, as defined above, is a prerequisite to
liability, or whether negligence alone is sufficient for recovery. If
scienter is required, a defendant would be liable only if his mis-
statement was made recklessly, knowingly, or with an intent to
defraud. If negligence is sufficient for liability, a defendant who
believed that his misstatement was accurate would nevertheless
be liable if his belief were unreasonable. Obviously under the
negligence standard a misstatement made recklessly, knowingly,
or with the intent to defraud would also be actionable. The issue
most discussed by courts and commentators is simply whether a
defendant should be liable for misstatements negligently made or
whether liability should be imposed only when a defendant's
state of mind may be characterized as more culpable-that is,
reckless, knowing or intentional.1
5
A number of cases, primarily from the Second Circuit, have
required something more than negligence for the imposition of
liability under 10b-5.11 One reason for this requirement seems to
be a desire to avoid nullifying other civil liability sections
-primarily sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933.17
This notion is reflected in Fischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing
Co.,'8 which involved alleged misstatements in a prospectus and
registration statement. Both misstatements would have been ac-
tionable under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. In at-
tempting to distinguish the remedies provided under section 11
from those provided under 10b-5, the court stated that "[a] suit
under § 11 of the 1933 Act requires no proof of fraud or de-
ceit. . . .But proof of fraud is required in suits under § 10(b) of
14. See Epstein, supra note 10, at 484; Bucklo, supra note 10, at 569.
15. For a discussion of the development of the scienter requirement in the Second
Circuit, see Bucklo, supra note 10, at 576-81. But see Wellington Computer Graphics,
Inc. v. Middell, 315 F. Supp. 24, 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1970): "[S]cienter is not essential to
establish a violation of Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 where it is sufficient merely to show
'lack of diligence, constructive fraud, or unreasonable or negligent conduct.'"
16. Id.
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 (k)-(1) (1970). See also Note, Negligent Misrepresentations Under
Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 824, 832 (1965).
18. 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
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the 1934 Act and Rule X-10b-5. ... 19
In a subsequent case, Weber v. C.M.P. Corp.,"° a district
court stated that 10b-5 liability should be dependent on "some-
thing more than mere misstatements which might be innocent or
negligent. ' 21 The court's reasoning again seems based on a desire
not to nullify the liability sections of the 1933 Act:
To give a private remedy under Rule 10b-5 . . .is simply
to duplicate (without their restrictions) the express liabilities
created by Sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act unless the remedy
under . . .Rule 10b-5 be made different. . . .If you wish to
avoid those limiting procedures [such as the short statute of
limitations], you must allege and prove real fraud, that is,
scienter. 2
Another basis for the rejection of negligence as the standard
for recovery is concern that the language of section 10(b), which
speaks of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contriv-
ance," 3 will not support such an extension. This concern was
reflected in Globus v. Law Research Services, Inc. 4 In Globus the
plaintiff's suit was based on an offering circular that prominently
referred to a contract with Sperry Rand but which did not men-
tion that the contract was presently being litigated. Sperry Rand
had terminated the contract for non-payment of consideration by
the defendant. In rejecting negligence as an appropriate standard
for liability, the district court stated that "it appears inescapable
that an implied civil action under § 10(b) requires the existence
of at least 'manipulative' or 'deceptive' conduct or a 'contrivance'
in order to fall within the congressional mandate.
25
19. Id. at 786.
20. 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
21. Id. at 324.
22. Id. at 325. See also 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 12, § 8.4 (523), at 204.133-35 and
§ 8.4 (525(1)), at 204.1137-40. "Some of the authorities treating actual knowledge as
sufficient for liability also seem to regard it as necessary. But only a few say so in a direct
fashion, and these may be of limited precedent value because of the pleadings before the
court." Id. at 204.133.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
24. 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 1278 (2d Cir. 1969). On appeal
the Second Circuit did not reach the question of whether negligence would support a
lob-5 claim, since it found the district court had utilized a standard more stringent than
negligence and the plaintiff had still prevailed. The Second Circuit voiced the same
concern in Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
25. Id. at 197. Professor Loss has noted that it is open to serious question whether
liability "without . . .fraud or scienter. . . is a permissible implementation of a statu-
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The reasoning of Fischman, Weber, and Globus indicates
two of the recurring arguments in favor of requiring scienter.
First, the finding of liability under 10b-5 based on the defendant's
negligence might undermine the-carefully framed limitations
imposed by section 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act.2" Further-
more, imposing negligence as a standard of liability could exceed
the authority vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission
by section 10(b), a section which speaks only of "manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance.""
Recently, the Second Circuit in Leasco Corp. v. Taussig2
refused to relax its strict scienter standard and reaffirmed the
proposition that something more than mere negligence was re-
quired for relief under 10b-5. In that case the plaintiff Leasco
sued for specific performance of a contract for the sale of Mc-
Creary-Koretsky International, Inc. to the defendant Taussig.
Taussig contended that there were misleading representations
made in violation of 10b-5. In holding that the defendant did not
possess the requisite scienter, the court stated that "mere negli-
gence is insufficient; there must be a showing of knowledge of
tory provision [section 10(b)] that speaks in terms of any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance.'" 6 L. Loss, supra note 11, at 3884. Other commentators, however,
have not been troubled by this problem. See, e.g., Note, Civil Liability Under Section lOB
and Rule 10b-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 683
(1965): "Section 10b and Rule 10b-5 are susceptible to an interpretation which would
allow suits for negligence." See also Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961): "It
would have been difficult [for Congress] to frame the authority to prescribe regulations
[under 10b-5] in broader terms."
26. See Note, Negligent Misrepresentation Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 824,
837 (1965). Another argument raised by the article against negligence as the standard
[d]erives from the tort theory by which civil liability is inferred when no privity
between plaintiff and defendant exists. Under this theory only the violation of
a criminal statute creates civil liability in the violator. But 10b-5 is not itself a
criminal enactment; violation of the rule . . . becomes criminal only when the
violation is willful, as provided by section 32. Since a plaintiff must establish a
criminal violation to support private recovery, therefore, he must establish the
defendant's 'willfulness.'
But see Note, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 69 CoLum. L. Rv. 1057, 1062 n.45 (1969): "Con-
trary to the belief of some commentators, this tort principle does not apply only to breach
of a criminal statute." The article goes on to state that the tort theory of recovery merely
provides a remedy for a violation of the rule. Whether negligence or some other state of
mind is required for a violation of the rule is unimportant for the application of a remedy
under this theory. Id. at 1062.
27. Although addressing a situation involving a non-privity misstatement, Judge
Friendly raises this argument in favor of a rejection of the negligence standard. See SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968) (concurring opinion).
28. 473 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972).
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falsity or feckless disregard for the truth. 29
In spite of the decisions of the Second Circuit, there exists
substantial authority indicating that negligence is the appropri-
ate standard for recovery in a face-to-face misstatement case.
3
1
Kohler v. KohIer Co.3' is illustrative of this line of cases. Kohler
involved a face-to-face transaction that fits into the "half-truth"
category, i.e., an omission "to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading. ' 32 The
plaintiff-a 10% shareholder, former employee, director and sec-
retary of the company-alleged that during negotiations which
resulted in the resale of his stock to the company, he had relied
on misleading figures of the company's earnings. Specifically, he
claimed that more recent earnings figures were available but were
not disclosed, that the figures contained an unusual excess profits
tax refund and that some of the accounting procedures may have
been misleading. Although the circuit court affirmed the lower
court's decision for the defendant, 3  it adopted a negligence stan-
dard for determining liability. After observing that the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 "was meant to cover more than deliber-
ately and dishonestly misrepresenting or omitting material facts
which ordinarily are badges of fraud and deceit,"34 the court
concluded that 10b-5 "requires the insider to exercise reasonable
and due diligence not only in ascertaining what is material as of
the time of the transaction but in disclosing fully these material
facts about which the outsider is presumably uninformed and
which would, in reasonable anticipation, affect his judgment.
'35
29. Id. at 785. See also Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir.
1971), which reaffirms the position that at least a reckless disregard for the truth must be
shown. In 1973 the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, held that reckless disregard for truth
was the appropriate standard for the nondisclosure situation. . .Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,
479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
30. For a compilation of the circuits which have held negligence to be sufficient, see
2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 12, § 8.4 (585), at 204.213-18. See also Bucklo, supra note 10,
at 576-80.
31. 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
32. Half-truths are generally equated with misstatements, since both are explicitly
prohibited by 10b-5(2). See A. BROMBERG, supra note 12, § 4.2, at 71. Even in a common
law action for fraud, which generally will not support recovery for nondisclosure, recovery
was permitted for half-truth situations, as well as misstatement situations. See L. Loss,
supra note 11, at 1433-35.
33. 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962).
34. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963).
35. Id. at 642. The language of this case indicates that once the appropriate state of
[Vol. 26
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In addition to Kohler, numerous cases reflect the acceptance of
negligence as an appropriate standard in the face-to-face mis-
statement situation.36
With regard to the face-to-face misstatement, two powerful
arguments may be asserted in favor of adopting negligence as the
appropriate standard of liability. First, such a standard would
"seem perfectly consistent with the broad Congressional design
• . .'to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets in * * *
[sic] *** [sic] [securities] transactions.' '31 As the Supreme
Court expressly recognized in Superintendent of Insurance v.
Bankers Life and Casualty Co.,3 one purpose of section 10b is the
preservation of the integrity of the securities markets. 39 A stan-
dard which operates more stringently on the defendant will in-
duce him to take additional care with his statements. This addi-
tional care will, in turn, protect "the public from any derogation
from 'free market conditions,' -'0 thereby insuring the integrity of
the securities markets.
In J.L Case Co. v. Borak,4 the Supreme Court made it clear
that the courts should fashion liability to accommodate the pur-
poses of the securities legislation. In holding that the courts have
jurisdiction to grant relief to private citizens for violation of the
proxy rules, the Court stated that "it is the duty of the courts to
be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effec-
tive the congressional purpose"42 of the securities laws. In apply-
ing the Borak reasoning to 10b-5 situations, absent some overrid-
mind is selected, it is then applied to the assessment of other elements. A similar concept
was advanced by the court in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir.
1968), with respect to a claim by some of the defendants that they did not know that the
ore strike information was not public. The court held that as reasonable men they should
have known, thus there was no defense.
36. See, e.g., City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 905 (1970). With respect to the issue of scienter, any face-to-face nondisclosure
case is also authority for the face-to-face misstatement situation. See text accompanying
note 49 infra. Further, any court that would permit recovery against a negligent defendant
in a non-privity situation would also permit recovery in the face-to-face situation. See text
accompanying notes 139-56 and 190-96 infra.
37. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968): "The securities
laws should be interpreted as an expansion of the common law ... to effectuate the broad
remedial design of Congress ..
38. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
39. Id. at 12.
40. Note, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 69 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1057, 1068 (1969). The author
makes this argument in the context of a situation where privity of contract is removed.
41. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
42. Id. at 433.
1975]
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ing policy consideration, the Court should select elements which
promote the protection of the investor and the integrity of the
marketplace. 3 The use of negligence as the standard applied to
a defendant's action would effect this end.
A second argument favoring adoption of a negligence stan-
dard for liability in the face-to-face misstatement situation is the
doctrine of fairness. In a situation in which the seller has induced
the purchaser to buy securities by negligently misstating a mate-
rial fact, a decision must be made as to who should be required
to absorb the resulting loss on the transaction. It seems indefensi-
ble to require an innocent purchaser to absorb this loss; it is only
appropriate that the person making the negligent mistake bear
the loss.44 The Borak Court indicated its awareness of the need
to do substantial "justice" by stating that "where legal rights
have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general
right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any
available remedy to make good the wrong done."45 Furthermore,
such an interpretation is not at odds with the language of section
10b which speaks of "the protection of investors."4
It is the position of this writer that, in the face-to-face mis-
statement situation, the negligent defendant should be held lia-
ble. This approach will promote the integrity of the securities
43, See text accompanying note 3 supra, for a discussion of the primary purposes of
rule 10b-5. See Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of
Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Ruder]. After recognizing that the reasoning of Borak "can be expected to be
extended to rule 10b-5," Ruder goes on to state that
[iuf the private right of action exists by direct implication from the statute
itself, federal courts will be free in interpreting Rule 10b-5 to fashion policy
which is not hampered by the logical complications inherent in the doctrines
traditionally advanced to support the private right of action under Rule 10b-5,
nor by detailed reference to legislative intent. By emphasizing the general pur-
poses of the securities acts and provided with the general and broad language
of Rule 10b-5, the federal courts will be able to create law in the securities field
almost without restriction.
Id. at 433.
44. This may be dubbed the bathtub theory: if someone must take a "bath," or loss,
it should be the party most culpable.
45. 377 U.S. at 433 (emphasis added).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). In discussing the somewhat different situation of corpo-
rate liability for inaccurate disclosures, at least two authors seem to agree with the per-
suasiveness of these arguments by saying "both the deterrence and compensation pur-
poses of rule 10b-5 require the employment of a negligence standard of conduct in dam-
age actions. . . ." Sander & Conwill, Texas Gulf Sulphur; Reform in the Securities
Marketplace, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 225, 273 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Sandier & Conwill].
[Vol. 26
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market as well as fairly apportion the loss resulting from the
transaction. There seems to be a decided trend in favor of this
position, both in the courts47 and among the commentators."
2. Face-to-Face Nondisclosure
Once it is agreed that there exists a duty to disclose in certain
situations, liability should generally be imposed for a breach of
that duty on the same terms as in the misstatement situation.49
Thus, in the face-to-face nondisclosure situation, a negligent non-
disclosure should subject the defendant to liability. In fact, most
courts have dealt with the face-to-face nondisclosure situations in
the same manner as with the face-to-face misstatement situa-
tions, assuming without discussion that the treatment should be
the same. In Myzel v. Fields,"0 for example, the Eighth Circuit
stated that "proof of 'scienter,' i.e. knowledge of the falseness of
the impression produced by the statements or omissions made, is
not required."51 The language of the court in Kohler5 2 also indi-
cated that, with respect to the required state of mind of the defen-
dant, face-to-face misstatements and face-to-face non-disclosures
should receive similar treatment: "[T]he statute was meant to
cover more than deliberately and dishonestly misrepresenting or
omitting material facts. .... ,,. 3
Those previous arguments supporting the use of negligence
as the standard in a face-to-face nondisclosure situation would
apply here. Selection of negligence as the appropriate standard
would promote the integrity of the market by providing the impe-
tus for disclosure of material facts. Moreoever, as a matter of
47. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971), which
accepts negligence as the appropriate standard, even in the non-privity situation. Al-
though one commentator states that in none of the circuits "has a plaintiff recovered
damages for conduct which was merely negligent," in four of the five circuits discussed,
it seems clear that negligence is the standard which the courts favor. See Bucklo, supra
note 10, at 575-90.
48. See 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 12, § 8.4 (585), at 204.217-18. But see Note, The
Role of Scienter and Need to Limit Damages in Rule 10b-5 Actions-The Texas Gulf
Sulphur Litigation, 59 Ky. L.J. 891, 911 (1971) (advocating the requirement of scienter).
49. See Ruder, supra note 43, at 411: "Once the disclosure obligation has been identi-
fied, considerations imposing liability are not significantly different than those existing
in misrepresentation cases."
50. 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
51. Id. at 734 (emphasis added).
52. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 391 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
53. Id. at 637 (emphasis added).
19751
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
fairness between the parties, the loss should be borne by the more
culpable individual. As a result, the appropriate standard for
recovering in a face-to-face nondisclosure situation should be neg-
ligence.
B. Plaintiff's "Reasonable Conduct" Requirement
In either a face-to-face misstatement or nondisclosure situa-
tion, the conduct of the plaintiff must meet certain standards or
he will be denied recovery." That notion is incorporated in two
distinct but related concepts: (1) the reliance of the plaintiff must
have been justifiable; and (2) the misstatement or nondisclosure
the plaintiff relied on must have been material. 5 Unless the
plaintiff's conduct conforms to this standard he should be denied
recovery notwithstanding the establishment of the other neces-
sary dlements.
1. Justifiable Reliance
In a misstatement situation, a requirement that "a plaintiff's
reliance must be justified" probably means that a plaintiff should
be "justified in his belief that the representation is true;"" in a
nondisclosure situation, justifiable reliance seemingly requires
that the plaintiff be justified in his failure to discover an undis-
closed fact.
In Myzel v. Fields, 7 the plaintiffs, after selling their stock to
defendants, alleged that, in making a sale of stock to defendants,
they had relied on misstatements and nondisclosures about the
financial condition of the company. In affirming the lower court's
decision in favor of the plaintiffs, the court addressed itself to the
standard to which the plaintiffs conduct should conform. One of
the plaintiffs was a man of some investment sophistication as well
as a director of the company. The court stated that if he "had
been misled solely by. . . statements or nondisclosures regarding
the company's value, and on that basis alone had sold his stock,
recovery would be denied."58 The court's reasoning was appar-
54. See text accompanying note 56 infra.
55. But see Cobine, Elements of Liability and Actual Damages in Rule lOb-5Actions,
1972 U. ILL. L. Fonum 651. The author states that materiality is "best classified as cause
in fact. . . ... Id. at 656.
56. W. PROssER, supra note 11, at 718.
57. 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
58. Id. at 736.
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ently based on the rule that "there is no duty to disclose informa-
tion to one who reasonably should already be aware of it." 5 The
Myzel court would apparently deny recovery, in a proper case, to
one who unreasonably relied to his own detriment on a misstate-
ment or nondisclosure."0
In City National Bank v. Vanderbloom61 the Eighth Circuit
discussed the issue of whether unreasonable conduct on the part
of a plaintiff would bar his right to recovery. Although the court
resolved the case on the issue of standing, it stated that recovery
should be conditioned on a finding that "a reasonable investor,
in light of the facts existing at the time of the misrepresentation
and in the exercise of due care, would have been entitled to rely
upon the misrepresentation. '6 2 The court applied this reasoning
to find that "a reasonable investor would not have relied upon
any representations" made in this case, apparently because of the
accessability of the company's books and records. The
Vanderboom court seemingly adopted a standard based on the
conduct of a reasonable man exercising due care.63 In other words,
a plaintiff's negligence in failing to discover the misrepresen-
tation will apparently prevent him from recovering.
The reasonable investor standard apparently was also
adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Clement A. Evans & Co. v.
McAlpine.64 McAlpine had purportedly created a facade of finan-
cial responsibility that permitted him to trade a large volume of
securities with the plaintiff. His checks were dishonored for insuf-
ficient funds, causing the plaintiff to sustain a loss in excess of
$300,000. Despite the dishonored checks, the plaintiff continued
to transact business with McAlpine and accepted his personal
checks although the normal procedure would have been to freeze
a customer's account for 90 days. In affirming the lower court's
denial of recovery, the circuit court commented extensively on its
conception of the plaintiffs duty in a 10b-5 case.65 Stating that
59. Id., citing Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
60. The court went on, "although not without great difficulty," to find sufficient
proof of reasonable reliance because of misstatements concerning the proposed conduct
of a trusted friend and advisor of the plaintiff, as well as the nondisclosure of the true
purchaser. Id. at 737.
61. 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
62. Id. at 230 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 231.
64. 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970).
65. This author would argue that 10b-5 is not applicable to the facts of this case since
the fraud concerned the financial position of the defendant, i.e., the sufficiency of funds
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the applicable standard for the plaintiffs conduct was "'the
objective standard of a reasonable investor exercising due care in
light of all facts . . . ,'" the court added to that standard "'a
duty of reasonable investigation . . . ." '" This language clearly
set up a reasonable investor standard to which the conduct of the
plaintiff must conform."7
The McAlpine court was, confronted, however, with a misre-
presentation which was allegedly intentional, rather than negli-
gent. Thus the possibility existed that a knowing misrepresen-
tation, or even a misrepresentation made with the intent to de-
fraud, would not be actionable simply because the plaintiff was
negligent in not discovering the misrepresentation. The court
addressed this problem by stating that
plaintiff's duty above espoused is not altered merely because
the misrepresentations are alleged to be intentional rather than
negligent. Surely plaintiff would not contend that a purchaser
or seller could justifiably rely on a fraudulent misrepresentation,
no matter how willfully and intentionally made, if that misre-
presentation would tax even the most credulous mind. 8
McAlpine demonstrates one of the difficulties in demanding
that a plaintiff's reliance on the misstatement or nondisclosure be
justifiable. The problem is the standard to which the plaintiff's
conduct must conform. Will the plaintiff be denied recovery if his
reliance is negligent, or will recovery be denied only if the reliance
on the misstatement or nondisclosure "would tax even the most
credulous mind?" These are clearly different tests, although the
court seemingly uses them interchangeably.
The Fifth Circuit subsequently added to the existing confu-
sion in Stier v. Smith." In Stier the plaintiff sued under 10b-5,
to cover the purchase of the securities, rather than a fraud "in connection with" the actual
securities transaction. As a result this case could have been treated as either a contract
action or an action for deceit rather than a 10b-5 violation. But see Superintendent of Ins.
v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
66. 434 F.2d at 104, quoting City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 230 n.10
(8th Cir. 1970).
67. This concept, obviously, is not unlike the concept of contributory negligence in
tort law which bars the plaintiff's recovery for his own negligence. It is based on a reasona-
ble man standard: "The plaintiff is required to conform to the same broad standard of
conduct, that of the reasonable man of ordinary prudence under like circumstances." W.
PnossER, supra note 11, at 419.
68. 434 F.2d at 104.
69. 473 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1973).
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alleging a nondisclosure of information in a disastrous public of-
fering undertaken by the issuer, Mickey Mantle's Country
Cookin', Inc. The district court denied the plaintiff relief because
his investment sophistication should have led to his discovery of
the undisclosed facts from accessible information. In reversing
and holding for the plaintiff, the Fifth Circuit characterized this
case as one in which the defendant "knew that he [plaintiff] was
purchasing in reliance on this fact [a successful public offering]
and there was [none]." 70 In this situation, where the nondisclo-
sure was knowingly made, the court was understandably reluc-
tant to deny the plaintiff relief because of contributory negli-
gence: "We should always be wary of holding that a purchaser of
securities could have found out omitted material facts by examin-
ing the corporate books or undertaking other extensive investiga-
tions." 7' Although the court concentrated its efforts on finding
reliance within the meaning of List v. Fashion Park, Inc. ,72 it
seems clear that the court would hesitate to deny a plaintiff relief
for mere negligent reliance. Nonetheless, the court again failed to
define the standard that should bar relief to a plaintiff when the
defendant had knowledge of both the nondisclosure and the
plaintiffs reliance thereon.
Most courts that have faced the issue have used reasonable
care as the standard to which the plaintiffs reliance must con-
form.73 Cases such as McAlpine and Stier, however, demonstrate
the imprecise analysis often employed by courts when confronted
with an allegation that the defendant's misstatement or nondis-
closure is more culpable than the plaintiff's negligence.
When a defendant's misrepresentation or nondisclosure is
negligently made, as opposed to being made recklessly, knowingly
or with the intent to defraud, reasonable care as the required
standard of conduct for the plaintiff appears unobjectionable.
7 4
The notion that it is proper to bar a negligent plaintiff from
70. Id. at 1210 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 1208.
72. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965). See also text accompanying note 134 infra.
73. See generally Comment, Reliance Under Rule 10b-5: Is the 'Reasonable Investor'
Reasonable?, 72 CoLuM. L. Rv. 562 (1972), in which the author states that, although the
test is phrased in terms of reasonableness, the standard may be subjective in some situa-
tions with the court lowering or raising the norm because of the qualifications of the
plaintiff.
74. See Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. Cm. L.
Rxv. 824, 841-44 (1965). The author advocates that negligence on the part of the defendant
should be actionable under 10b-5 and that reasonable reliance should be required.
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recovery when the defendant's act was merely negligent receives
substantial support from tort law.75 Under the law of torts, recov-
ery may be sought either on the theory that a common law action
for deceit will lie for negligent misstatement, or on the theory that
recovery for negligence should be extended beyond compensation
for personal injury and property damage to compensate for pecu-
niary loss.7" In cases that raise the issue, the courts have held that
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff bars his recov-
ery.
77
When a plaintiffs cause of action is based on the more tradi-
tional notions of deceit involving an intent to mislead, negligence
on the part of the plaintiff is not grounds to bar his cause of
action. As Professor Prosser views the required standard, a plain-
tiff will be barred from recovery only when his conduct is "so
utterly unreasonable, in light of the information open to him, that
the law may properly say that his loss is his own responsibility."
78
This "utterly unreasonable" test seems to fall somewhere be-
tween negligence and knowledge. Thus, Prosser appears to say
that a plaintiff who acts in reckless disregard of the truth will be
barred from recovery.
This test is a logical expression of the standard of conduct
to which the plaintiff in a 10b-5 suit must conform. It seems fair
that negligent reliance on the part of a plaintiff should bar his
recovery when the defendant's omission or misstatement is
merely negligent. This approach would be consistent with the tort
doctrine of not reapportioning loss when both parties are negli-
gent." It seems unfair, however, to deny the negligent plaintiff
75. The most elementary example is the concept of contributory negligence. See
generally W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 416-27.
76. Id. at 705. See also Gediman v. Anheuser Busch Co., 299 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.
1962) (negligent advice given to an employee concerning how to exercise rights under a
pension plan); Anderson v. Tway, 143 F.2d 95, 99 (6th Cir. 1944) (negligence with respect
to nondisclosures about the financial status of a company); Brown v. Underwriters at
Lloyd's, 53 Wash. 2d 142, 146, 332 P.2d 228, 230 (1958) ("A representation of fact believed
to be true but which proves to be false is actionable, and our law as of right ought to and
does afford a remedy for the damage sustained by the representee . . . ."); Gould v.
Flato, 170 Misc. 378, 10 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (recognizing liability for negligent
misstatement only where as a matter of good faith and general social policy the defendant
should exercise diligence, but finding such a relationship in a purchaser-seller situatioh).
77. See, e.g., Gould v. Flato, 170 Misc. 378, 10 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (contri-
butory negligence on the part of a purchaser of an expensive string of pearls barred her
recovery from the seller when her cause of action was based on negligent misrepresen-
tation); Vartan Garapedian, Inc. v. Anderson, 92 N.H. 390, 31 A.2d 371 (1943).
78. W. PRossER, supra note 11, at 715.
79. See text accompanying note 74 infra.
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recovery when the defendant's state of mind is either reckless,
knowing or intentional. In that situation the denial of recovery to
the plaintiff would require the less blameworthy party to bear the
loss. Where the defendant's misstatement or omission is made
recklessly, knowingly or intentionally, the plaintiff should be
barred from recovery only if his reliance was "utterly unreason-
able" or in reckless disregard of the truth."
The selection and definition of the elements of recovery
should be made to promote fairness among the parties and to
further the purposes of the securities legislation.8 1 The confusion
that has crept into this area, as exemplified by McAlpine 2 and
Stier,83 has resulted from analyses which are imprecise and which
fail to apply the sound policy considerations vital to a definition
of the elements of recovery. The courts must avoid both the mis-
take made in McAlpine, simply confusing the standard to which
the plaintiff's conduct must conform,84 and the imprecise analysis
of the Stier v. Smith approach in dismissing the reliance issue
with the statement that "[wje should always be wary of holding
that a purchaser of securities could have found out omitted mate-
rial facts by examining the corporate books or undertaking other
extensive investigation.81 5 Both approaches demonstrate the ab-
sence of a critical, policy-oriented analysis that will avoid need-
less confusion.
2. Materiality
a. In General
Even if his reliance is justifiable, a plaintiff in the face-to-
face misstatement or nondisclosure situation will be barred from
recovery unless the misstatement or nondisclosure involved is
"material." This element is unequivocally expressed by the 10b-
5 prohibition of "any untrue statement of a material fact." 6
80. For a similar analysis, see Cobine, Elements of Liability and Actual Damages in
Rule 10b-5 Actions, 1972 U. ILL. L. F. 651, 658-67.
As a logical extention of the notion that the plaintiff should be barred from recovery
only if he is as culpable or more culpable than the defendant, it may be appropriate, when
the defendant's misstatement or omission is knowingly or intentionally made, to bar the
plaintiff only when he has knowledge of the untruth.
81. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
82. 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970).
83. 473 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1973).
-84. 434 F.2d at 104 (5th Cir. 1970).
85. 473 F.2d at 1208 (5th Cir. 1973).
86. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1973) (emphasis added).
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Thus, without distinguishing between the nondisclosure and mis-
statement cases, Professor Bromberg refers to materiality as "one
common law element that is still going strong under 10b-5.
' '
1
7
The formulation of a test of materiality has been less than
successful."8 At present, however, it appears settled that the ma-
teriality of any fact is determined with reference to the reasonable
man standard. A material fact must be one which would have an
effect on a reasonable man's investment decision with respect to
the security in question. One definition of materiality which has
gained substantial acceptance is derived from List v. Fashion
Park, Inc. 9 In that case, involving a face-to-face nondisclosure,
the court defined the test of materiality to be whether" 'a reason-
able man would attach importance [to the undisclosed fact] in
determining his choice of action in the transaction in ques-
tion.' ""' The court elaborated by stating that this test "'encom-
passes those facts which in reasonable and objective contempla-
tion might affect the value of the corporation's stock or securities
... , ,,1 This formulation of the test of materiality has been
utilized by later 10b-5 cases, including the now famous Texas
Gulf Sulphur case.2
87. 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 12, § 8.3, at 199. See also Cobine, Elements of Liability
and Actual Damages of Rule 10b-5 Actions, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 651, 655: "One of the best
established elements of rule 10b-5 liability is that any misstatement or omission must be
material to be actionable."
88. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). The court
discussed materiality in terms of a fact that "would materially affect the judgment of the
other party to the transaction." Id. at 800. In Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.
1963), the court defined materiality in terms of "[flacts ...which in reasonable and
objective contemplation might affect the value of the corporation's stock or securities
." Id. at 642.
A number of commentators have also expressed opinions about the appropriate for-
mulation of materiality. See Fleischer, Controls on Insider Trading, 34 U. Mo. K.C.L.
REv. 210, 217 (1966) ("facts which. . . can reasonably be expected to have a significant
impact on the market"); Ferber, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders, 34 U. Mo.
K.C.L. REv. 222, 224 (1966) (fact which "might reasonably be expected to have a substan-
tial effect on the price of the company's securities . . ."); Cary, Symposium-Insider
Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAw. 1009, 1014 (1966) (facts which "would have a significant
effect on the marketprice of the stock").
For a discussion of the various formulations of materiality by courts and commenta-
tors see Wiesen, Disclosure of Inside Information-Materiality and Texas Gulf Sulphur,
28 MD. L. REv. 189, 204-11 (1968). See also Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 973, 800 (1968).
89. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).
90. Id. at 462, quoting RESTATEMENT OF ToRrs § 538(2)(a) (1938).
91. Id., quoting Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963).
92. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968). In Myzel v.
Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), the court cited List approvingly, and defined material-
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b. Misstatements
If the defendant is to be held liable under 10b-5 for negligent
misstatements, the requirement of materiality is unobjectionable
if defined in terms of the reasonable man, since reliance on a non-
material fact would seem tantamount to negligence on the part
of the plaintiff. If a plaintiff's investment judgment is affected by
a non-material fact that a reasonable man would not deem impor-
tant, the plaintiff would seem to be contributorily negligent and
should be barred from recovery against a merely negligent defen-
dant. If, however, a particular defendant's misstatement is made
with a more blameworthy state of mind (i.e., recklessly, know-
ingly or intentionally), to bar the recovery of a plaintiff who relied
on a non-material misstatement seems improper. To deny re-
covery would be to reject the notion that the more blameworthy
party should bear the loss. Thus, a plaintiff who was merely negli-
gent would be barred from recovery from a defendant whose
actions were either reckless, knowing or intentional. 3 The unfair-
ness of this result can be illustrated by the following example:
ity to mean "facts 'which in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value
of a corporation's stock or securities to the seller.'" Id. at 734. See also Rogen v. Ilikon
Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 266 (1st Cir. 1968); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir.
1963).
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to examine in depth the myriad of facts
deemed by the courts to be material, some examples may prove instructive. In Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947), the act of selling substantially
all the corporate assets was termed a material fact. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), a rich mineral strike was deemed material. In SEC v. Shattuck
Denn Mining Corp., 297 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the reopening of negotiations of a
previously announced agreement to purchase an oil refinery was held to be a material fact.
In Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), the nondisclosure of
appreciation of assets coupled with an intent to liquidate the company was held to be
material. Professor Loss questions, however, whether the undisclosed intent to liquidate
in Transamerica was necessary to establish materiality. 3 L. Loss, supra note 11, at 1460-
62.
Although a determination of whether a fact is material will often be uncertain, it has
been argued that "a careful analysis of the facts involved, together with the application
of honest judgment and common sense will generally produce the right answer." Kennedy
& Wander, Texas Gulf Sulphur, A Most Unusual Case, 20 Bus. LAw. 1057, 1067 (1965).
For an in depth discussion of cases dealing with the issue of materiality, see 3 L. Loss,
supra note 11, at 1457-65, supplemented by 6 L. Loss, supra note 11, at 3577-3601.
93. In the chapter of the RESTATEMrENr or ToRTS dealing with misrepresentation,
materiality is first defined as an element "to whose existence or nonexistence a reason-
able man would attach importance in determining his choice of action. . . ." The second
section, however, enlarges the definition to include the situation when "the maker of the
representation knows that its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as impor-
tant, although a reasonable man would not so regard it." RESTATEIENT (SEcoND) or ToRTs
§ 538 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964) (emphasis added).
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Assume that Seller (S) was a shareholder in X Airways, and,
in the course of selling his stock to Purchaser (P), S incorrctly told
P that X was going to paint its planes a number of different
colors. Assume further that S gave P this information in an at-
tempt to induce P to purchase the stock, but without any knowl-
edge of its truth or falsity. Finally, assume that, although a rea-
sonable man would attach no importance to this information, P
believed it to be significant. If materiality is defined with refer-
ence to a reasonable man, P would be denied recovery because he
did not respond reasonably to the misstated information. This
result seems unfair since S's statement appears to have been
made in reckless disregard of the truth. When the defendant's
misstatement is made recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally, the
plaintiff should be denied recovery only when his conduct is "ut-
terly unreasonable" or reckless. Thus, in the preceding
hypothetical, P should be denied recovery only if his judgment of
the importance of the misstated fact was "utterly unreasonable."
To apportion the loss fairly in a situation where the conduct
of a defendant has been reckless, knowing or intentional, there-
fore, materiality should be defined in terms of "recklessness."
Under this standard, a plaintiff would be barred from recovery
only when the misstated fact was so insignificant as to make his
reliance on it "utterly unreasonable."
c. Nondisclosures
If the other elements of recovery are met, a defendant who
negligently fails to disclose a fact to a plaintiff should be held
liable under rule 10b-5.14 Where liability in the face-to-face non-
disclosure situation is predicated on such simple negligence, it is
appropriate to define materiality with reference to a reasonable
man. If the undisclosed fact was one that would not have been
important to a reasonable man, therefore, the negligent defen-
dant should not be held liable. Even if the plaintiff can show that
he would have deemed the undisclosed fact important, recovery
should be denied since a plaintiff who would place importance on
such a trivial fact would be responding unreasonably or negli-
gently. Thus, his own unreasonable conduct would render his loss
as much his fault as the fault of the negligent defendant. To deny
the plaintiff a recovery in this situation would be consistent with
94. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
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the notion, expressed above, that the law should not reapportion
loss if the parties are equally blameworthy.
If the defendant's failure to disclose is reckless, knowing or
intentional, however, should the law define materiality in terms
of a reasonable man standard or in terms of recklessness, thus
denying liability only if the undisclosed fact was so trivial that
to deem it important would be reckless conduct? Although this
altered standard of materiality would be consistent with the ap-
proach suggested for the face-to-face misstatement situation, it
should nevertheless not be generally applied in the case of a
reckless, knowing or intentional nondisclosure by a defendant.
The test of materiality should be defined in all cases with
reference to a reasonable man. Although such a rule may some-
times result in the less blameworthy party bearing the loss,
this result is necessitated by the inherent nature of the non-
disclosure situation, which involves a step absent from the
misstatement situation. Since materiality is the primary factor
in determining whether a nondisclosure violates 10b-5, a poten-
tial defendant is forced to review those facts within his knowl-
edge to make a judgment as to what facts must be revealed. This
determination requires the potential defendant to apply some
standard to those facts. If the standard is the objective, reasona-
ble man standard, then the difficulty in determining what facts
should be revealed is minimized. If the definition of materiality
were altered, however, to include all facts that affect the invest-
ment judgment of non-reckless investors, the potential defendant
would be confronted with the Solomonic task of determining
which facts would be deemed material in the subjective percep-
tion of an unreasonable investor.
Assume that S was a shareholder in X Airways and, in the
course of selling his stock to P, S did not reveal the inside infor-
mation that one of the vice-presidents of X was about to resign.
Unless that information were deemed material (i.e., one to which
a reasonable man would attach importance in determining
whether to purchase the stock), S should not be held liable, even
though there was nondisclosure of a known fact. This result is
necessitated because S needs a workable standard by which to
ascertain those disclosures that must be made. To require the
disclosure of all information that some unreasonable person may
perceive to be important is impracticable since it would be impos-
sible to determine what facts must be disclosed. Liability in this
situation would seem clearly unfair to a corporate insider who
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wanted to sell his stock. "
The defendant must be given a workable standard to ascer-
tain those facts that must be revealed in a face-to-face transac-
tion. This standard can fairly be provided only with reference to
the reasonable man. For this reason, plaintiffs should be barred
from recovery unless the nondisclosure involves a fact that would
affect the investment judgment of a reasonable man. Any less
stringent standard gives inadequate guidance to the defendant
regarding his required course of conduct."
C. Reliance
1. Face-to-Face Misstatement
Prior to Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 7 it was assumed that
reliance98 was a prerequisite for recovery under rule 10b-5.9  Reli-
ance is a subjective element implying that the particular plain-
tiff's investment decision was influenced by the misstated fact.
Accordingly, for a plaintiff in a face-to-face misstatement situa-
tion to recover, the particular misstatement must have been a
substantial factor in his investment decision.' 0 Thus, for exam-
95. Comparing this to the misstatement situation, if P asked S if the vice-president
had been fired and S, although knowing the contrary to be true, told P that the vice-
president had not been fired, P should not be barred from recovery unless the misstated
fact were so insignificant as to make his reliance on it utterly unreasonable. Arguably the
purchaser should be barred only if he knew the statements were false.
96. The one possible exception may be where the seller knows that the purchaser
would deem the fact important and thus intends to "defraud" the purchaser. In that
situation, it would seem that non-disclosure of the fact should be actionable, even though
it was not a fact which would influence the judgment of a reasonable man.
97. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
98. One point concerning the definition of reliance deserves emphasis. Reliance exists
under a 10b-5 analysis if the plaintiff relies on the defendant's misstatement in his
decision to purchase or in his decision as to the proper purchase price of the security
involved. If, for example, the defendant-seller makes a misstatement to the plaintiff-
purchaser regarding the earnings of the company, and this misstatement does not per-
suade the plaintiff to purchase, but does persuade him that the stock is worth $15 per
share rather than $10, reliance is established as required for a 10b-5 cause of action.
99. See generally 6 L. Loss, supra note 11, at 3876-80; 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 12,
§ 8.6(1), at 289; Dykstra, The Battle Grounds of 10b-5, 1971 UTAH L. REv. 297. "In face-
to-face transactions the reliance approach . . . continues, in all probability, to have
validity." Id. at 305.
The requirement of reliance in 10b-5 causes of action was not clear in the early cases.
For example, in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 83 F. Supp. 613, 614 (E.D. Pa. 1947),
the judge found that representations of the defendants "were relied upon, although the
result would be the same if they had not been."
100. This tort concept is borrowed from the law of misrepresentation which requires
that a defendant's action be only a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's conduct
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ple, if Seller (S), in the course of negotiations with Purchaser
(P) for the sale of X corporation stock, incorrectly states that Mr.
Adams has just been appointed president of X, P will be permit-
ted recovery only if the misstated fact was a substantial factor in
his investment decision. If, however, P's decision was made for a
different reason, e.g., X was to manufacture a new product, P
would not recover because he did not rely on the misstatement.
That reliance was a necessary element of recovery, prior to Mills,
is exemplified by Janifan v. Taylor.' Here, the plaintiff, a share-
holder of Boston Electric Steel Casting, Inc., sold his stock to the
defendant, who was the president, general manager and a director
of the company. During the sale negotiations, the defendant was
asked if he knew of any material change in the affairs of the
company. The defendant falsely responded in the negative. In
affirming the liability of the defendant, 112 the court stated that
reliance was a requirement for establishing liability.0 3
Mills, however, raised serious questions about the continued
viability of reliance as a requisite element of recovery.0 4 There the
plaintiff alleged a violation of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act
rule 14a-9, which forbids the solicitation of proxies by the use of
any statement that is "false or misleading with respect to any
material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary
in order to make the statements therein not false or mislead-
ing . . .. 11 The plaintiff complained that the material used to
solicit proxies for a proposed merger between his company, Elec-
tric Auto-Lite, and Mergenthaler Linotype Company was defi-
and not the sole or even paramount inducement. Neuman v. Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 356 Pa. 442, 51 A.2d 759 (1947). See generally W. PRossER, supra note 11, at
714-20.
101. 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
102. The court affirmed the lower court's decision for the plaintiff, but remanded the
case on the issue of damages.
103. 344 F.2d at 786: "[U]nder any interpretation of the Act, [reliance] is a neces-
sary condition." See also Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, (1st Cir. 1966). Judgment
should be rendered for the defendant "if it has been demonstrated as a matter of law that
plaintiff in no way relied on such possible nondisclosure of material facts." Id. at 267.
104. Some cases have dismissed the need for reliance altogether. See, e.g., Vine v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967). Vine, however, represents a special fact
situation. The plaintiff was a nonacceptor of a tender offer, and the defendant, after its
alleged deception in making a tender offer, effected a short form merger, thus forcing the
plaintiff to accept cash for his shares. Since the plaintiff was forced to "sell" his shares, a
showing of reliance was held to be unnecessary "in the limited instance when no volitional
act is required." Id. at 635.
105. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1973). An interpretation of rule 14a-9 is especially rele-
vant to rule 10b-5(2) since the language of the two rules is essentially identical.
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cient in stating that Auto-Lite recommended the merger without
revealing that all the directors were nominees of Mergenthaler.
Apparently sensitive to the seventh circuit's concern that "reli-
ance by thousands of individuals . . can scarcely be inquired
into,' '"I the Supreme Court seemingly relieved the plaintiff of the
burden of establishing reliance on the misstatement as a prere-
quisite for recovery. Once materiality had been established, the
Court stated,
There is no need to supplement this requirement. . . with
a requirement of proof of whether the defect actually had a
decisive effect on the voting. Where there has been a finding of
materiality, a shareholder has made a sufficient showing of
causal relationship between the violation and the injury for
which he seeks redress if, as here, he proves that the proxy
solicitation itself, rather than the particular defect in the solici-
tation materials, was an essential link in the accomplishment of
the transaction. This objective test will avoid the impracticali-
ties of determining how many votes were affected, and, by re-
solving doubts in favor of those the statute is designed to pro-
tect, will effectuate the congressional policy of ensuring that the
shareholders are able to make an informed choice when they are
consulted on corporate transactions." 7
Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton""0 exemplified the un-
certainty of the status of reliance after Mills. In the course of
negotiations which ultimately led to the university's purchase of
oil and gas production payments, misstatements of the estimated
revenues from the oil wells were made. In granting a summary
judgment for the plaintiff,0 9 the court addressed itself to the ele-
ment of reliance. Recognizing that "in 10b actions, 'most of the
authorities require some reliance by the plaintiff upon the data
that was furnished,' ,,10 the court discussed Mills, but refused to
106. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 436 n.10 (7th Cir. 1968). The
Seventh Circuit determined the existence of reliance by reference to the fairness of the
terms of the merger. The court held that if the merger was fair in its terms, the defendants
would have satisfied the court that the merger would have been approved even without
the misleading statements, thereby establishing the absence of reliance or causation. The
Supreme Court, however, rejected this approach, stating that such a formulation "would
allow the stockholders to be bypassed . 396 U.S. 375, 381 (1970).
107. 396 U.S. at 384-85.
108. 326 F. Supp. 250 (D. Md. 1971).
109. The court had presented the plaintiff with the choice of opting for damages after
refusing to grant summary judgment for rescission.
110. 326 F. Supp. at 257.
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construe that case as eliminating the need for reliance. Instead,
the court stated that "in this case, inquiry into the fact of reliance
is not impractical and such inquiry undisputedly establishes...
reliance . "11... "
In another post-Mills case, Kohn v. American Metal Climax,
Inc. ,",2 the Third Circuit was less than unanimous in determining
the necessity for establishing reliance in a 10-5 recovery. Kohn
grew out of an amalgamation between American Metal Climax,
Inc. (AMAX) and Roan Selection Trust Limited (RST). The op-
erating assets of RST were to be turned over to the government
of Zambia and the non-operating assets would either be distrib-
uted to the shareholders of RST or amalgamated into AMAX. In
return AMAX was to give the non-AMAX shareholders of RST
$76 million in 8% subordinated debentures with common stock
warrants attached and $6.3 million in cash. Kohn filed a deriva-
tive action against AMAX on behalf of RST and all non-AMAX
shareholders of RST. In finding a violation of 10b-5 because of
material misrepresentations in the proxy solicitation material,
the majority apparently rejected the notion that reliance is a
prerequisite to establishing a cause of action under 10b-5:
We think those alleging a violation of Rule 10b-5 have an obliga-
tion to show a fraudulent and material misrepresentation and
that to the extent a reliance factor is required, in the present
context it is encompassed by the finding that the misrepresen-
tation was material.1
3
In a separate opinion, Judge Adams disagreed with the idea
that reliance is no longer important in a 10b-5 private action.
Although conceding that both section 10b and rule 10b-5 are si-
lent on the subject of any reliance requirement, he concluded that
Congress clearly intended that as part of a plaintiff's case he
prove that he relied on the particular misleading statement of
which he complains [and that] most cases discussing the mat-
ter hold that reliance is an essential element in an action for
damages under the securities laws."'
111. Id. at 260 (emphasis added).
112. 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1972).
113. Id. at 269. One commentator has read this statement as "establishing a pre-
sumption of reasonable reliance where it is reasonable to suppose that reliance in fact
existed." Comment, Reliance Under 10b-5: Is the "Reasonable Investor" Reasonable?, 72
CoLUi. L. REV. 562 (1972).
114. 458 F.2d at 288. See also Latty, The Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of
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With respect to Mills' relaxation of the reliance requirement, he
distinguished the decision as "a class action under Section 14 and
the proxy rules-provisions serving a different purpose from Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and having substantially different
standards." ' Beyond this, Judge Adams was apparently willing
to accept Mills' relaxed reliance requirement because it was a
class action. He viewed 10b-5 cases as falling within two catego-
ries with respect to the requirement of reliance: class or injunctive
actions"' and individual damage suits. In the former, he found no
need for a reliance element because of the administrative impos-
sibility of each individual plaintiff in a class suit proving his
individual reliance. Recognizing that "in Mills, the objective test
was primarily adopted to obviate the need to prove reliance on
the part of each member of the class,"" 7 Judge Adams felt that
demanding such a showing would negate the effectiveness of class
actions but believed that proof of reliance was still required in
individual damage suits.
In 1972, the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States"' may have further weakened the reliance require-
Shares in a Close Corporation Under the S.E.C. Statutes, 18 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 505,
526-27 (1953). "There is nothing in [rule lOb-51 to indicate that 'reliance' . on the
untruth or omission is dispensed with."
115. 458 F.2d at 289.
The thrust of the proxy rules is to ensure that shareholders receive accurate
information by enabling objectors to a proxy statement to enjoin the distribu-
tion or voting of proxies, or action taken pursuant to the vote, early in the
process, while it is still relatively easy to correct the defect. Accordingly, it is
appropriate that reliance and culpability not be essential independent elements
of a Section 14 action. While the main thrust of Section 10b is to achieve the
same goal, it does so by the significantly different method of prescribing penal-
ties, civil and criminal, for the dissemination of false and misleading state-
ments. In such case, reliance and culpability form crucial ingredients in the
cause of action, and the equation in Mills of materiality with causation and
reliance becomes inapplicable.
Id.
116. In the injunctive situation, Professor Loss points out:
Civil actions differ from administrative proceedings under the rule, whose aim
is to deter misconduct by insiders rather than to compensate their victims.
There the fact that no harm actually results from the misconduct . . . is ordi-
narily irrelevant to the preventive purposes.
6 L. Loss, supra 11, at 3877.
117. 458 F.2d at 290.
118. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). Although Ute was decided as a nondisclosure case, it is
appropriate to discuss the case in the misstatement situation, since it is the only one in
which the Supreme Court discusses its concept of the element of "reliance" in a lob-5
action.
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ment as the pillar of a 10b-5 cause of action. The plaintiffs in Ute
claimed that the defendants had made misstatements and non-
disclosures violative of Rule 10b-5 in connection with a sale of
shares in the Ute Development Corporation. The Supreme Court
found that the defendants failed to disclose that they were market
makers in the securities and that the price the plaintiffs were to
receive was below the market price."' The court then rejected
reliance as a prerequisite for recovery:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a
failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite
to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be
material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have
considered them important in the making of this decision.
[Citing inter alia, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.] This obliga-
tion to disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish
the requisite element of causation in fact. '
Thus, do Mills and Ute indicate that reliance is no longer
required in the face-to-face misstatement situations? From the
standpoint of policy considerations, arguments can be marshalled
favoring the deletion of reliance as a prerequisite for recovery."'
Since the plaintiff's reliance is a subjective factor often estab-
lished by self-serving testimony, one might argue that to require
reliance in a face-to-face misstatement case may relegate the
element to an empty ritual of pleading and testifying. 2 A more
119. Id. at 153.
The individual defendants ... were market makers.... This being so, they
possessed the affirmative duty under the Rule to disclose this fact to the mixed-
blood sellers. [Citations omitted]. It is no answer to urge that, as to some of
the petitioners, these defendants may have made no positive representation or
recommendation. The defendants may not stand mute while they facilitate the
mixed-bloods' sales to those seeking to profit in the non-Indian market the
defendants had developed and encouraged and with which they were fully famil-
iar. The sellers had the right to know that the defendants were in a position to
gain financially from their sales and that their shares were selling for a higher
price in that market.
Id.
120. Id. at 153-54.
121. See, e.g., Bucklo, supra note 10, at 592, where the author opines that the element
of reliance will probably be eliminated.
122. 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 12, § 8.6(2), at 210: "Requiring reliance is likely to
produce only a ritual of pleading followed by 'I relied' testimony from the plaintiff. This
is true if the alleged offense is misrepresentation. . . ." Professor Loss seems to worry
about the same problem, although he addresses himself to the nondisclosure situation. 3
L. Loss, supra note 11, at 1766. In the supplement to that section, Loss softens his
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persuasive argument in favor of eliminating reliance as a prere-
quisite to recovery under 10b-5 is that the in terrorem effect of
deleting reliance may result in fewer misleading statements being
made.ln In J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,24 the Supreme Court, in af-
firming the existence of a private remedy for a violation of rule
14a-9 of the proxy rules, indicated that the courts had substantial
flexibility in fashioning remedies to promote the goals of the se-
curities acts. It could be argued that relaxation of the reliance
requirement would promote the goal of truthful information, and
thus logically extend the Borak analysis by providing greater de-
terrence against the type of conduct which rule 10b-5 attempts
to proscribe.
An examination of the cases suggests, however, that neither
policy considerations nor the language of Mills and Ute demand
the deletion of reliance as a prerequisite for a recovery under 10b-
5. In Mills the Court stated that "[wihere there has been a
finding of materiality, a shareholder has made a sufficient show-
ing of causal relationship between the violation and the injury for
which he seeks redress. . . ."' The Court continued by stating
that "[t]his objective test will avoid the impracticalities of de-
termining how many votes were affected [and will resolve]
doubts in favor of those the statute is designed to protect .... ""2
In Ute the Court stated that in
the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to
disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recov-
ery. . . .This obligation to disclose and this withholding of a
material fact establish the requisite element of causation in
fact. 27
The language of both cases indicates that causation-in-fact,
a causal connection between the wrong and harm suffered by the
position: "The author may have been a bit too relaxed, however, in suggesting. . . that
reliance, if required in a case of alleged violation by silence, 'may mean little more than
the inclusion of the word in the complaint.'" 6 L. Loss, supra note 11, at 3878.
123. In discussing List one author favored the court's use of a relaxed reliance test,
apparently because the easier recovery would encourage suits, thereby deterring the type
of conduct which the section and rule were intended to prevent. Comment, Securities
Regulation: Reliance on Material Misrepresentation or Nondisclosure Essential to Sustain
10b.5 Action, 50 MINN. L. REv. 759, 764 (1966).
124. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
125. 396 U.S. at 385.
126. Id.
127. 406 U.S. at 153-54.
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plaintiff, is essential to recovery. In a face-to-face misstatement
situation, there can be no causation-in-fact unless the plaintiff
relied on the misstatement. 1 8 Absent reliance by the plaintiff in
this situation, the misstatement by the defendant simply would
not be a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's in-
jury,2 ' and, consequently, there would be no harm in fact caused
by defendant's misstatement. To illustrate, assume that defen-
dant, an X corporation shareholder who wishes to sell his stock,
makes an offer to sell to plaintiff. In the course of negotiations,
defendant tells plaintiff falsely that the company has just signed
a large contract to supply goods to the government. Plaintiff's
decision to purchase at the price he was willing to pay is not,
however, based on defendant's misstatement. Instead, plaintiff
relied on the high liquidation value of the assets of the corpora-
tion and his own assessment of a new product developed by X
corporation. In this case, there is no harm caused by defendant's
misstatement, since plaintiff's purchase was determined by other
factors.
Mills and Ute should not be interpreted as permitting plain-
tiff to recover in the foregoing illustration, since the requisite
element of causation-in-fact is absent. Rather, Mills and Ute
should be construed as explicating the method by which plaintiff
can prove causation-in-fact or reliance. Plaintiff can meet his
burden of proof with respect to subjective reliance and causation-
in-fact by a showing of materiality-that a reasonable man would
attach importance to the misstated fact in determining his choice
of action in the transaction in question. Thus when the Mills
Court found a "sufficient showing of causal relationship" by a
finding of materiality, and when the Court in Ute found that the
"withholding of a material fact establish[ed] the requisite ele-
128. Analytically, causation-in-fact and reliance are not necessarily identical because
a finding of reliance in the face-to-face misstatement does not answer the question of how
much damage was in fact caused by the misstatement. See Painter, Insider Information:
Growing Pains for the Development of Federal Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65
CoLNt. L. REv. 1361 (1965); Comment, Civil Liability Under Section lOB and Rule lOB-
5; A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 671-72 (1965). The
absence of any reliance, however, seems to result in no causation-in-fact in the face-to-
face misstatement situation.
129. "The reason for this requirement [of reliance] as explained by the authorities
cited is to certify that the conduct of the defendant actually caused the plaintiffs injury."
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965). See also Comment, 32 U. Cm. L.
REv., supra note 74, at 841; the author bases his opinion that reliance is required for
recovery on the need to limit the class of persons recovering to those the legislation was
intended to protect-"conscientious buyers and sellers."
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ment of causation-in-fact," the Court was presuming subjective
reliance from a finding of materiality.
A finding of materiality, however, should not be taken as a
conclusive presumption of causation-in-fact. The presumption
would be rebuttable, allowing the defendant the opportunity to
show that the plaintiff did not rely on the misstatement in assess-
ing his course of conduct. If the defendant can meet this burden,
the plaintiff should be denied recovery because he suffered no
harm caused by the misstatement.'30 This interpretation of Mills
and Ute would be consistent with the compensatory nature of
civil actions under 10b-5. As Professor Loss has stated: "Civil
actions differ from administrative proceedings under the rule,
whose aim is to deter misconduct by insiders rather than to com-
pensate their victims. 1 3' Moreover, this remedial function of the
rule has been recognized by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau,'3 1 where the Court said that the rule
should be construed "not technically and restrictively, but flexi-
bly to effectuate its remedial purposes."'3
2. Face-to-Face Nondisclosure
As in the face-to-face misstatement situation, reliance
seemed firmly established as a prerequisite to recovery in the
face-to-face nondisclosure situation, at least prior to Mills. The
significance of the reliance factor, however, becomes less appar-
ent in the face-to-face nondisclosure situation. The question
which arises is: How does one rely on a fact not disclosed? In List
v. Fashion Park, Inc.,' the Second Circuit explained how the
element of reliance fits in the face-to-face nondisclosure situa-
tion. After affirming that reliance was a prerequisite to liability
130. Although not necessarily advocating this position, Bromberg suggests the pre-
sumption of release from materiality as one which "makes sense," but he makes it clear
that "the presumption would, of course, be rebuttable by appropriate evidence." 2 A.
BROMBERG, supra note 12, § 8.6(2), at 212. Bromberg views this method as having the
advantage'of eliminating the "empty pleading", of reliance. Id. Another commentator
advocates a similar interpretation of Mills and the pre-Ute cases. Comment, Reliance
Under Rule 10b-5: Is the "Reasonable Investor" Reasonable?, 72 CoLuM. L. REy. 562, 565
(1972).
131. 6 L. Loss, supra note 11, at 3887. See also Sandler & Conwill, supra note 46, at
273 (1964), where the authors speak of "both the deterrence and compensation purposes
of Rule 10b-5."
132. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
133. Id. at 186, quoted in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151
(1972).
134. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).
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under rule 10b-5, "to certify that the conduct of the defendant
actually caused the plaintiff's injury,"lr the court defined reli-
ance in the nondisclosure situation: "The proper test is whether
the plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently than
he did act if the defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed
fact. 1 3 Thus, as in the misstatement situation, reliance is a
subjective element, established only if the particular plaintiff
would have been influenced to act differently had the fact been
disclosed.
The Supreme Court characterized the fact pattern in Ute as
"involving primarily a failure to disclose.' ' 37 As previously dis-
cussed, Ute should be read as establishing in the nondisclosure
situation a presumption of reliance from a showing of materiality,
affording the defendant an opportunity to rebut the presumption
by showing that the undisclosed fact would not have influenced
that particular plaintiff to act differently. As in the face-to-face
misstatement situation, the elimination of reliance as an element
of recovery in the face-to-face nondisclosure situation would be
contrary to the remedial nature of 10b-5 because this would allow
a plaintiff who has suffered no injury from the nondisclosure to
recover. Reliance is thus made an element to be presumed from
materiality, with the defendant having the opportunity to rebut
the presumption of reliance. Once materiality is shown, "the rea-
sonably prudent investor would be expected to rely. This is more
straightforward than requiring an empty pleading and proof, or
playing word games with nondisclosure." '38
135. Id. at 462. Although courts regularly state that reliance by the defrauded party
is necessary for recovery under 10b-5, closer analysis suggests this view to be an oversim-
plification. "More accurately, reliance and causation are no longer clearly distinguishable
requirements inter se or relative to . . . materiality. Rather, they have become partially
interchangeable and various combinations. . . suffice in different situations." 2 A. BRoM-
BERG, supra note 12, § 8.6(1), at 209. Consequently, causation-in-fact is sometimes ab-
sorbed into the element of reliance and vice versa in deciding whether there has been a
violation of 10b-5.
136. 340 F.2d at 463. In List, the court found that the undisclosed fact, the identity
of the purchaser, was not relied on by the plaintiff and was of no concern to him. With
respect to the other alleged nondisclosure, the possible merger of the corporation, the
court could not find clearly erroneous the lower court's holding that at the time of the sale
the nondisclosed fact was not material. Id. at 464.
137. See text accompanying note 118 supra. As one commentator has stated: "Reli-
ance established the element of causation, without which the defendant becomes the
guarantor, even if the plaintiff's loss was in no way induced by the misrepresentation or
omission of which he now complains." Comment, Reliance Under Rule lOb-5: Is the
"Reasonable Investor" Reasonable?, 72 COLUm. L. RLv. 562, 565 (1972).
138. 2 A. BROsMRo, supra note 12, § 8.6(2), at 212. In 1961, four years prior to List,
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D. Summary
In the face-to-face misstatement and nondisclosure situa-
tions either negligence or scienter on the part of the defendant
should support a recovery by the plaintiff. If, however, the plain-
tiff has not acted reasonably, he should be barred from recovery.
Where the defendant's nondisclosure or misstatement is
negligently made, the conduct required of the plaintiff is simply
that he act reasonably (or, nonnegligently) in assessing the im-
portance of the misstated or undisclosed fact. In addition to this
requirement of "materiality," the plaintiff must be reasonable in
both believing that the misrepresentation is true and in not dis-
covering the undisclosed fact. Thus, a negligent plaintiff should
be denied recovery from a negligent defendant.
If the defendant's misstatement or nondisclosure is made
recklessly, knowingly or intentionally, his conduct should be ac-
tionable a fortiori. Negligence on the part of the plaintiff, either
in assessing or investigating the importance of the fact, should
not bar recovery. The plaintiff should be denied recovery only if
his actions were reckless. The exception to this analysis arises in
the nondisclosure situation. A defendant who objectively assesses
the significance of a fact in terms of a reasonable man standard
and concludes that the information is not material, should prevail
over a non-reckless plaintiff even if the plaintiff subjectively
would have attached importance to the information. This distinc-
tion is necessary to provide an insider with a workable standard
for assessing which facts are significant enough to be disclosed.
In both the face-to-face nondisclosure and misstatement sit-
Professor Loss had voiced concern about whether the element of reliance was of any
practical significance in the nondisclosure situation. Although stating that "it is difficult
not to think in terms of reliance as inherent in the very theory of the action when there is
, .I a breach of a duty to speak," he goes on to state that "reliance if required in such a
case may mean little more than the inclusion of the word in the complaint." 3 L. Loss,
supra note 11, at 1766.
Since Ute, the lower courts have been predictably confused with respect to the necess-
ity of reliance as an element of recovery under 10b-5. Some courts have indicated that
reliance is still an element of recovery under 10b-5. See, e.g., Landy v. Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp. 486 F.2d 139, 170 (3d Cir. 1973). More typically, however, the courts have
avoided the issue by finding it unnecessary to interpret Ute. See, e.g., Cohen v. Franchard
Corp. 478 F.2d 115, 124 n.12 (2d Cir. 1973) ("The fullest implications of those decisions
[i.e., Ute and Mills] have not yet been determined."); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton,
488 F.2d 912, 914-15 (4th Cir. 1973); In re Penn Cent. Secs. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327
(E.D. Pa. 1972); Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1359 (10th Cir. 1974) ("the implication of
the Supreme Court's opinion was that the element of causation in some form remained
. . o p).
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uations, reliance or causation-in-fact should be required. It may
be appropriate, however, to presume reliance from a finding that
the undisclosed or misstated fact was one which a reasonable man
would deem important in assessing his investment decision.
IH. NON-PRIVITY MISSTATEMENT
A third factual pattern giving rise to a private action under
10b-5 is the non-privity misstatement situation. If, for example,
X corporation (defendant) makes a false statement and Y (plain-
tiff) purchases X corporation's securities from a third party after
learning of the statement, Y may then sue X corporation for a
violation of rule 10b-5.
Removing privity from the transaction, however, requires
alterations in the elements necessary for 10b-5 recovery. Achiev-
ing fairness among the parties and promoting the integrity of the
securities market may not be possible under the same configura-
tion of elements as was appropriate in the face-to-face situation.
The most obvious non-privity characteristic is the increased
number of potential plaintiffs. Thus, if X corporation in the
above example is held to have violated 10b-5 for making a public
misstatement, its liability would no longer be confined to a single
transaction, but instead might extend to a plethora of purchasers
or sellers whose transactions were affected. A re-examination of
the elements of recovery is necessary in light of this changed
circumstance.
A. Scienter
In the face-to-face nondisclosure and misstatement cases,
even the negligent defendant should be held liable. A negligence
standard produces the fairest result by allocating the loss to the
more blameworthy party and would promote the integrity of the
marketplace by providing an impetus to potential defendants to
exercise greater care. When the element of privity is removed
from the transaction, however, it seems more appropriate to hold
the defendant liable only when the misstatement was made reck-
lessly, with knowledge of its falsity, or with an intent to de-
fraud.3 ' The concept of fairness and the furtherance of the integ-
139. For a discussion of non-privity misstatement cases see Note, Scienter and Rule
10b-5, 69 COLtM. L. Rav. 1057, 1077-82 (1969); Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corpo-
rate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51
VA. L. REv. 1271, 1292-94 (1965).
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rity of the securities market may necessitate the imposition of
liability only if the defendant's state of mind is more blamewor-
thy.
In Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,' one of the private
damage suits arising from the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation,'
Texas Gulf was sued by plaintiffs, who had sold their stock after
the deceptively gloomy April 12th press release. In this non-
privity misstatement situation, the court held that "plaintiffs
must show more than that the April 12 press release was negli-
gently prepared. They must show some degree of scienter."'' 2 The
court went on to recognize that "fraudulent motives, in the tradi-
tional common law fraud sense, need not be shown. . . .Heit
and Globus indicate that knowledge of the falsity of statements
may be sufficient."'1
3
In another case, Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,'4' plain-
tiffs again alleged a violation of 10b-5 because they sold their
stock after learning of the April 12th press release. After rejecting
the defendant's contention that trading by the defendant was a
prerequisite for recovery by the plaintiffs,'4' the court grappled
with the problem of whether mere negligence on the part of the
defendant making the misstatement should be actionable. Al-
though recognizing that the Second Circuit required some
degree of scienter, the Mitchell court rejected that approach and
apparently adopted negligence as the appropriate standard for
recovery:
One is not to be held liable *** because of his misleading misre-
presentation or omission of material fact ... if the party re-
sponsible for the misrepresentation or omission sustains the bur-
den of proving that he did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known that it was a misrepresen-
tation or omission.14 0
140. 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
141. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
142. 306 F. Supp. at 1344.
143. Id.
144. 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
145. Id. at 102:
The result which we here support is that insider trading is not a requisite for
lOb-5 violation by misrepresentation. As appropriately stated by the Second
Circuit, "a corporation's misleading material statement may injure an investor
irrespective of whether the corporation itself, or those individuals managing it,
are contemporaneously buying or selling the stock of the corporation."
146. Id., quoting from Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 357 (10th Cir. 1970). There are
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The notion that liability, absent privity, is appropriate only
where the defendant's state of mind can be characterized as reck-
less, knowing or intentional has been most persuasively advo-
cated by Professor Ruder. 4 ' Although Ruder finds it acceptable
to impose liability for negligence in a privity situation,"' he balks
at imposing liability for negligence in the non-privity misstate-
ment situation: "Under such circumstances, massive liability for
negligent misrepresentation or nondisclosure . ..seems un-
fair."1 Ruder's unfairness argument is based on the disparity
between the potential liability of the defendant and the offensive-
ness of his conduct. In his opinion the saddling of the defendant
with so massive a potential liability for a misstatement made in
good faith, albeit negligently, stretches the notion of fairness be-
yond the point of tolerance.
Beyond the notion of fairness, however, there are other persu-
asive arguments that negligence should not result in liability in
the non-privity misstatement situation. Judge Friendly, in his
concurring opinion in Texas Gulf, feared that imposing a negli-
gence standard would result in drying up the sources of corporate
information:
If the only choices open to a corporation are either to remain
silent and let false rumors do their work, or to make a communi-
cation, not legally required, at the risk that a slip of the pen or
failure properly to amass or weigh the facts . . .will lead to
a number of unresolved problems with the court's statement. First, the authority for the
statement, the Gilbert case, involved section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, as well
as a violation of 10b-5. Second, the court reallocated the burden of proof, requiring the
defendant to bear the burden of showing his due diligence. In subsequent cases, however,
the Tenth Circuit has retreated from the position stated in text. In Financial Indus.
Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 522 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 874 (1973), the court stated that the "burden of showing lack of due care in such
circumstances is part of the plaintiff's case." More significantly, the tenth circuit has re-
cently stated that mere negligence on the part of the defendant is not sufficient for re-
covery under rule 10b-5. Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974). Although the
Third Circuit has indicated that recovery in the non-privity misstatement situation does
not depend upon establishing an intent to mislead, it has also indicated that mere negli-
gence is not sufficient for recovery. What is not clear, however, is whether knowledge or
recklessness is the standard. See Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 169
(3d Cir. 1973).
147. See Ruder, supra note 43.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 442. But see Sandler & Conwill, supra note 46, at 278 (1969), which rejects
Ruder's notion because of "the substantial diminution in deterrent force" which is likely
to result.
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large judgments . . . most corporations would opt for the
former. 0
Consequently, subjecting a corporation to non-privity liability
would undercut a primary purpose for all securities legisla-
tion-guaranteeing a continuing stream of information to public
investors. 5'
The courts should be guided by sound policy reasons in se-
lecting and defining the elements of a 10b-5 cause of action and
it is desirable for courts to modify the requisite state of mind in
order to promote the integrity of the securities market and fair-
ness among the parties.5 ' Allowing non-privity recovery for a neg-
ligent misstatement creates an intolerable disparity between the
offensiveness of the act and the liability which may be sustained
by the defendant.5 3 If one adds to this resulting unfairness the
possibility that a negligence standard may in fact result in less
information being made available, it becomes difficult to justify
the Mitchell result.'54 In the non-privity misstatement situation,
liability should be predicated on recklessness, knowledge of the
falsity or intent to deceive. Although open to attack because it
might result in a "substantial diminution in deterrent force,""'
150. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968).
151. This problem has been discussed by a number of commentators. See, e.g., Note,
Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1057, 1081 (1969). See also Cary,
Symposium-Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1012-13 (1966); 82 HAav. L.
REV. 938, 948-51 (1969) (rejecting negligence as the appropriate standard because it would
discourage disclosure of information; the author is ready, however, to place the burden of
proving good faith on the corporation making the misstatement); Fleischer, Securities
Trading and Corporate InformationPractices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur
Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1292-95 (1965) (accepting liability for non-privity mis-
statements made by corporations where the misstatement was "knowingly" made, "at
least where reliance. . . is intended by the company," but advocating care in presuming
the requisite intent, because "[s]uch a policy . . . might tend to cut off an important
source of information for investors and would frustrate the policy of the securities laws of
encouraging disclosures."
The merit of Judge Friendly's argument is dependent on a rule that there would be
no liability against the corporation for nondisclosure of material facts. See text accompa-
nying note 179 infra.
152. Although not necessarily in this context, a number of commentators have advo-
cated varying the elements of recovery in different situations. See, e.g., Note, Scienter and
Rule 10b-5, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1057, 1070-73 (1969), in which the author advocates negli-
gence as a standard applicable to a tipper while a tippee would be liable only if "reckless
indifference" were present.
153. See Ruder, supra note 43, at 442.
154. 446 F.2d at 102.
155. Sandier & Conwill, supra note 46, at 268.
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this possibility must be accepted in order to assure fair treatment
of the parties involved. '56
B. Plaintiff's "Reasonable Conduct" Requirement
1. Justifiable Reliance
In the face-to-face situation the plaintiff should be barred
from recovery under rule 10b-5 for negligent misstatements and
nondisclosures if his conduct was negligent. But, in the case of a
misstatement or nondisclosure made recklessly, knowingly or
with an intent to defraud, recovery should be denied only if the
plaintiff's conduct was "so utterly unreasonable. . . that the law
may properly say that his loss is his own responsibility."'1 57 It is
questionable, however, whether the same standards should be
applied in a non-privity misstatement situation.
In Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., ' a case which in-
volved a non-privity misstatement, the defendants argued that
the plaintiff's reliance on the April 12th press release was unrea-
sonable and thus recovery should be denied. The court held that
in order to recover, the purchasing plaintiffs must have acted "in
good faith and with due diligence."' 59 With respect to the sales
made by plaintiff Reynolds on April 16th and sales made by
plaintiff Mitchell on April 17th, the court allowed recovery, con-
cluding that "good faith and due diligence were exercised in the
sale of these shares."' 60 In regard to a later sale of shares, however,
the court found that reliance on the April 12th press release, in
light of the curative press release of April 16th, was unreasonable.
A possible interpretation of Mitchell is that a plaintiff may
be denied recovery for negligent reliance on a misstatement
knowingly made by a defendant. One commentator has referred
to the April 12th press release as "misleading, intentionally de-
ceptive, inaccurate, and knowingly deficient in material facts
"161 The Tenth Circuit, in a subsequent case, stated that
the April 12th press release "was obviously and intentionally mis-
156. At least one court has already indicated that the state of mind of the defendant
may vary according to the fact pattern involved. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir.
1974).
157. W. PROSSER, supra note 11 at 715. See also text accompanying notes 56-85 supra.
158. 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
159. Id. at 103.
160. Id.
161. Cobine, Elements of Liability and Actual Damages in Rule 10b-5 Actions, 1972
U. ILL. L.F. 651, 658 [hereinafter cited as Cobine].
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leading.""'6 With respect to the standard to which the plaintiff
must conform it is hard to construe "due diligence" (the Mitchell
Court's standard) to mean anything other than freedom from
negligence. '
In discussing the face-to-face misstatement situation, this
author suggested that the denial of recovery for negligent reliance
on a reckless, knowing or intentional misstatement was unsound
because the loss should be absorbed by the more blameworthy
party. In a non-privity situation, however, the desire to allocate
loss fairly may require a different result.
The issue seems to be whether, in a non-privity misstatement
situation, the need to limit the potential class of plaintiffs justi-
fies denying a negligent plaintiff a remedy for a reckless, knowing
or intentional misstatement. This author feels that it does not.
When the defendant's state of mind is reckless, knowing or inten-
tional, rather than merely negligent, the possibility of extensive
liability is less offensive. There is nothing unfair about holding
liable a defendant who recklessly, knowingly or intentionally
makes a misstatement that is relied on by non-privity plaintiffs
who negligently fail to discover its falsity. In such a situation a
plaintiff should be denied recovery only if his conduct is reckless
or utterly unreasonable. An accommodation to the tremendous
potential liability is properly made by shifting the standard ap-
plicable to the defendant from negligence to recklessness.
On the other hand, Mitchell might be interpreted as barring
recovery because of a plaintiff's negligence in a situation where
the defendant's misstatement was merely negligent. This author
believes that liability should be imposed in a non-privity situa-
tion only for conduct by a defendant that is more blameworthy
than negligent. If, however, courts are determined to hold a non-
privity defendant liable for negligent misstatements, then clearly
the justifiable reliance requirement should be manipulated to
limit the class of potential plaintiffs. Such a constraint on recov-
162. Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 522 (10th
Cir, 1973). It seems clear, however, that liability in Mitchell would have been predicated
on the absence of due diligence by the defendant. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
446 F.2d 90, 102 (10th Cir. 1973).
163. Accord, Bucklo, supra note 10, at 579 ("[D]ue diligence . . . clearly implies a
negligence standard."); 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 12, § 7.2(4)(d), at 154.2. ("The dili-
gence test plainly contemplates that negligent conduct may be a lOb-5 violation."); But
see Cobine, supra note 161, at 659 ("The justifiable reliance or due diligence standard
applied by the Mitchell Court should not be mistaken for a contributory negligence
theory . . ").
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ery would not only be fair to the plaintiff, but would also be fair
to the defendant in helping alleviate the disproportionate liability
that he may suffer for a mere negligent misstatement.
2. Materiality
The concept of materiality as a prerequisite for recovery in a
face-to-face misstatement case is well established.' 4 Although
the definition of materiality should be altered in situations in-
volving reckless, knowing or intentional misstatements by the
defendant, courts have generally defined materiality as informa-
tion to which "a reasonable man would attach importance...
in determining his choice of action .. ."I" The important issue,
however, is whether materiality should be redefined in the non-
privity misstatement situation.
In Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,' a non-privity mis-
statement situation, the Tenth Circuit found the necessary ma-
teriality to hold Texas Gulf liable for misstatements made in its
April 12th press release. After defining the test for materiality in
familiar terms-whether "considering the complaining parties as
reasonable investors, the disclosure of the undisclosed facts...
would affect their trading judgment,"' 67-the court assessed the
discrepancy between the disclosed facts and the truth. It con-
cluded that "the known size and quality of the ore body was
material information; that is, the trading judgment of reasonable
investors would not have been left untouched upon receipt of such
information."'68
The Mitchell case, therefore, indicates that the concept of
materiality has not been relaxed in the non-privity cases since the
test is still based on the response of a reasonable man. But was
the Mitchell court correct in using the same standard for materi-
ality in a non-privity misstatement situation as is used in the
face-to-face situation? Professor Bromberg has suggested that
"materiality needs to be more pronounced and more carefully
measured in open-market transactions because of potential mas-
sive liability to hordes of investors. ."'" Finding some judicial
164. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
165. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965).
166. 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
167. Id. at 97.
168. Id. at 99-100.
169. 2 A. BRONMERG, supra note 12, § 8.3, at 199. Another author has been willing to
alter the materiality requirement for other reasons. He believes that there should be a
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support for a stricter test for materiality,7 0 he maintains that
courts as a matter of attitude should look more carefully at the
issue of materiality in the non-privity situation. Superficially
Bromberg's formulation seems to conform with the notion that
policy considerations should shape the definition of the elements
of recovery. If there is to be liability in the non-privity situation
for misstatements negligently made (a result that this author
does not advocate), Bromberg's analysis seems sound. If a plain-
tiff's investment judgment is affected by the misstatement of a
non-material fact (that is, a fact that a reasonable man would not
deem important), then his subsequent actions would seem tanta-
mount to negligence. Such conduct should bar a plaintiffs recov-
ery if the defendant's misstatement was negligently made. Fur-
thermore, Professor Bromberg's notion, that in a non-privity situ-
ation the courts should more closely scrutinize the materiality of
the misstatement, seems proper in light of the massive liability
that may accompany a negligently made statement.
This author, however, rejects the idea that liability ought to
be imposed in a non-privity misstatement situation when the
defendant's state of mind is merely negligent. Liability should
instead be conditioned on a finding of reckless conduct by the
defendant. If the defendant's conduct is reckless (or even more
blameworthy) the definition of materiality should change. It is
unfair to deny recovery to a plaintiff who relied on a non-material
misstatement which was recklessly, knowingly or intentionally
made, solely because a reasonable man would not have attached
importance to the misstated fact. The plaintiff should instead be
barred from recovery only if the misstated fact was so insignifi-
cant as to make his reliance on it reckless or utterly unreasonable.
C. Reliance
There is a trend to de-emphasize the importance of reliance
in 10b-5 causes of action. 71 Much of the pressure to de-emphasize
stricter standard for materiality (i.e., requiring more proof to establish materiality) in the
case of insiders who trade on the open-market than in the case of those who merely tip.
His reasoning is that, in the open-market situation, there is a legitimate interest served
by requiring that managers have a stake in the corporation which they manage. With
respect to tipping, however, no such interest exists, thus a looser standard of materiality
would suffice. Wiesen, Disclosure of Inside Information-Materiality and Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 28 MD. L. Rav. 189, 208-11, (1968).
170. 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 12, § 8.3, at 199-200.
171. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Mills v. Elec-
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the element of reliance apparently stems from the mechanical
difficulties in handling suits involving large numbers of plaintiffs.
This concern is demonstrated by both the Seventh Circuit and
the Supreme Court in the Mills litigation. As the Seventh Cir-
cuit stated, "Reliance by thousands of individuals, as here, can
scarcely be inquired into.""17 Since this factor is more often asso-
ciated with non-privity situations, the Seventh Circuit favors
not requiring each plaintiff in a non-privity suit to prove reliance
-especially in class actions.
Should the element of reliance be completely eliminated as
a requirement in non-privity situations? Although the elimina-
tion of reliance as a necessary element would simplify the me-
chanics of a successful 10b-5 suit, the result would be unaccepta-
ble for at least two reasons. First, if a plaintiff has not relied on
the defendant's misstatement, causation-in-fact is absent. A re-
covery in a case where causation-in-fact was not established is
impossible to justify. Second, the elimination of privity in the
transaction greatly increases the likelihood of numerous suits
against a defendant who has made a misstatement. The possibil-
ity of extensive liability, coupled with an absence of causation-
in-fact, makes recovery by a plaintiff even more unfair. Such a
result would permit a suit by a non-privity plaintiff who sold his
stock to a third party, when neither the plaintiff-seller nor the
third party purchaser was even aware of the defendant's misstate-
ment. It would therefore seem proper to establish a rebuttable
presumption of reliance after a showing of materiality. Thus, the
element of causation-in-fact would be maintained, but the me-
chanical difficulties of multiple-party suits would be obviated.
D. Summary
In the non-privity misstatement situation, recovery for a 10b-
5 violation should be predicated on a showing that the defen-
dant's misstatement was made with reckless disregard for the
tric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d
255 (3d Cir. 1972).
It has been suggested, however, that these cases should not be read as eliminating
the requirement of reliance but rather read as establishing a presumption of subjective
reliance from a showing of materiality, leaving open to defendants the opportunity to
rebut the presumption by evidence of the plaintiffs nonreliance.
172. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 436 n.10 (7th Cir. 1968).
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truth, with knowledge of the falsity of the misrepresentation, or
with an intent to defraud. The plaintiff's conduct must have
involved reliance on a material fact. Materiality should be rede-
fined to bar a plaintiff's recovery only if the misstated fact was
so insignificant as to make his reliance on it either reckless or
utterly unreasonable. Correspondingly, a plaintiff's reliance
should be considered justifiable even if he acts negligently, since
the defendant's state of mind is more blameworthy. His reliance
on the misstatement should be presumed from a showing that the
misstatement was one which would influence the investment de-
cision of a reasonable man. The defendant in the non-privity
misstatement situation, however, should have the opportunity to
rebut this presumption by showing that the plaintiff did not in
fact rely on the misstatement.
IV. NON-PRIVITY NONDISCLOSURE
The final fact pattern to be discussed is the non-privity non-
disclosure situation. Assume X Corporation learns of some impor-
tant development that will adversely affect the price of its stock,
but fails to disclose this development to the general public. Dur-
ing the time after the discovery of the development by X but
before its disclosure, Purchaser buys a share of X stock from
Seller, a third party. The result is a non-privity nondisclosure
situation and the issue raised is whether Purchaser can sue X
Corporation or X's inside management under rule 10b-5 for fail-
ing to disclose the information.13 In contrast to discussed fact
patterns, it is not clear from the cases that liability exists under
any combination of elements. An appropriate starting point for
discussion is a determination of whether such a fact pattern
should ever be actionable under rule 10b-5.
173. One issue which has been deliberately omitted from this discussion is whether
anyone other than the corporation and its high ranking officials has a duty to make a
disclosure of inside information in the non-privity situation. For example, would an ac-
countant who learns of adverse inside information incur liability to market purchasers if
he did not make a public disclosure of the information? The courts have generally been
reluctant to extend the duty to disclose at least where there is no special relationship
between the nondisclosing party and the plaintiff. See Slade v. Sherson, Hammill & Co.,
240 Sec. Reg. L. Reps. D-1 (D.N.Y. 1974) (liability of nondisclosing broker to broker's
customers for continuing to recommend after learning of adverse inside information);
Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1973) (refusal to hold broker
liable for nondisclosure where he had no dealings with the plaintiff). But see Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (tippees
who traded without disclosing held liable to non-privity purchasers).
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A. Liability Without Regard to Market Activity
In a recent case the Tenth Circuit apparently accepted the
idea that liability may exist in the nondisclosure non-privity situ-
ation, without regard to whether or not the defendant is in the
market. In that case, Financial Industrial Fund, Inc. v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp.,174 the plaintiff had purchased a total of
80,000 shares of McDonnell Douglas stock on June 22 and 23,
1966. On June 24, 1966, the plaintiff learned of a press release by
McDonnell Douglas disclosing that its earnings for the last six
months were far below the estimates of independent market
analysts and brokers. Subsequently, the plaintiff sold the stock
at a substantial loss and brought a 10b-5. action to recover his
losses.
Financial Industrial Fund was not litigated as a misstate-
ment case. Rather, the case turned on whether liability should
result from McDonnell Douglas' nondisclosure on the date when
the plaintiff purchased the stock.175 Although remanding the case
with directions to enter a judgment for the defendant notwith-
standing the verdict, 7 ' the court made it clear that non-privity
nondisclosure by a corporation may be actionable in certain situ-
ations: "It is. . . obvious that an undue delay not in good faith,
in revealing facts, can be deceptive, misleading, or a device to
defraud under rule 10b-5.' '17  It appears that the absence of any
market transaction by the defendant would have been of no im-
portance to the court's decision. 78
The commentators are not in agreement that there should be
liability for nondisclosure when no privity exists between the
plaintiff and defendant-especially when the defendant himself
is not exploiting the nondisclosure by engaging in the purchase
or sale of securities. As Professor Loss has stated, "[I]t has not
yet been established (and should not be) that either the company
or its insiders are liable to market buyers or sellers for non-
174. 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1973).
175. Id. at 517-18: "[Tihe issue becomes whether the silence of defendant at the date
or dates of the stock purchases by plaintiff here gives rise to a cause of action under rule
10b-5."
176. The court found that McDonnell Douglas exercised good faith and due diligence,
and that the plaintiff had not shown "the reliance required nor facts to meet the standard
of due diligence on his part." Id. at 521.
177. Id. at 519.
178. There was some market activity by McDonnell Douglas during this period,
although the court does not appear to make that a prerequisite for recovery. Specifically,
there had been a conversion by a number of debenture holders, who exercised the right to
convert in response to a call of the debentures by McDonnell Douglas. Id. at 516, 520-21.
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disclosure when there is no inside trading." 7 ' Professor Ruder
likewise rejects the idea that a non-trading defendant should be
liable for a failure to disclose information. Ruder views the act
that gives rise to 10b-5 liability as the use of the information."'
Other commentators, however, are not as certain that the non-
trading defendant will avoid liability in the non-privity nondis-
closure situation.81
If the defendant is engaged in market transactions, commen-
tators generally accept the imposition of liability for nondis-
closure to plaintiffs who have made purchases from third parties.
although even this position is not unanimous. 8 An example of
the lack of unanimity is demonstrated by two cases growing out
of the Texas Gulf litigation. In Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,'83
the plaintiffs had sold their stock after the initial discovery of the
mineral deposit on November 12, 1963, but before the public
disclosure of the strike. Plaintiffs sued the defendant corporate
insiders, who had made purchases from third parties during that
period, for not disclosing the mineral discovery. In response to the
defendant's motion for a summary judgment, the court held that
the plaintiffs had "stated claims under Rule 1Ob-5."' '  In
179. 6 L. Loss, supra note 11, at 3597. Professor Cary also agrees that there should
be no liability absent market activity by the corporation. Cary, Symposium-Insider
Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAw. 1009, 1014 (1966).
180. Ruder, supra note 43, at 442. Professor Ruder admits that, although "affirmative
disclosure obligations may be justified from an administrative viewpoint, imposition of
large liability on the corporation for failure to make such disclosure when it is not engaged
in a transaction does not seem warranted. . . ." Id. at 443.
181. Halleran, Symposium-Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1025
(1966):
It doesn't take much of an extension of the SEC position in Texas Gulf to say
that corporate management which has the power to disseminate material corpo-
rate information, (even though the corporation itself is not trading in its own
securities) and deliberately withholds it, may be liable to the innocent people
who bought or sold at either inflated or deflated prices.
182. See, e.g., Ruder, supra note 43, at 441-42. But see Note, Civil Liability Under
Section lob and Rule 10b-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE
L.J. 658, 675-76 (1965). The latter article reasons that since there is no liability in the non-
privity nondisclosure situation when the corporation is not trading, there should be no
liability where the corporation is trading.
In this situation, it would seem absurd to turn a damaged person into a plaintiff
merely because of the fortuity that an insider happened to be trading. . . .To
impose liability would be to tax the insider with responsibility for an injury
which his misconduct did not cause.
Id. at 676.
183. 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
184. Id. at 13,12. It should be pointed out, however, that the court stated that "[h]ad
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Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,"' however, the Tenth Circuit
reached a different result. The plaintiff there had sold his stock
on December 11, 1963, after the mineral discovery had been made
but before the drilling results had been disclosed. He attempted
to hold liable the executive vice-president of the company, Fo-
garty, who had purchased Financial securities on the open-
market during that period. The court refused to hold Fogarty
liable, because "there was no duty at that time on the part of...
defendant to disclose the information. . . with respect to drilling
results, and [because] Fogarty's violations of the statute and the
rule by purchasing TGS stock did not cause any damage to Plain-
tiff. . "..186
The absence of a purchase or sale by the defendant has no
effect on the damage done to the plaintiff. The harm results solely
from the fact that the plaintiff did not have all available data
when making his investment decision. 87 The decision to extend
liability to non-privity plaintiffs' for the nondisclosure of infor-
mation should thus be made without reference to market activ-
ity. '8 If one views the imposition of liability in a non-privity
nondisclosure situation as a function of the policy considerations
of fairness and the purposes of the securities legislation, it seems
hard to avoid the conclusion expressed by the Tenth Circuit
[the defendants] neither bought nor recommended TGS securities, there would have
been no duty to disclose." Id. at 1341.
185. 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971), aff'g on other grounds Reynolds v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970).
186. 309 F. Supp. at 559.
187. See Note, Civil Liability Under Section lob and Rule 10b-5: A Suggestion for
Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 676 (1965).
It is interesting to note that in the non-privity misstatement situation, there is judi-
cial authority for the notion that the absence of insider transactions is irrelevant to
recovery. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 102, quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 at 861 (2d Cir. 1968): "'[A] corporation's misleading material
statement may injure an investor irrespective of whether the corporation itself, or those
individuals managing it, are contemporaneously buying or selling the stock of the cor-
poration.'"
188. Again it should be emphasized that this discussion is limited to liability of the
corporation and its top management. It may make sense to restrict liability to persons who
trade and to exonerate defendants who are, for example, mere tippees. In the latter
situation, a non-trading tippee's nondisclosure may be deemed an act that is not blame-
worthy enough to result in his liability.
189. Although my respect for the judgment and analysis of Professor Ruder is evi-
denced by this article, I am unable to agree with his notion that unfairness, which is a
prerequisite for liability, results only from the use of the undisclosed information. Ruder,
supra note 43, at 442. I would suggest instead that unfairness might result from non-
disclosure if the defendant possesses the requisite state of mind.
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that, at least under some circumstances, a non-privity nondis-
closure situation should be actionable. First, the imposition of
liability in such situations would encourage the disclosure of that
material information needed for intelligent investment choice,
thereby promoting the integrity of the marketplace. Second, if
the nondisclosing defendant's state of mind is sufficiently
blameworthy (reckless, knowing or intentional), fairness would
seem to dictate that he absorb the loss of the plaintiff's unin-
formed market transactions. This reasoning, however, serves
only to demonstrate that liability in the non-privity, nondis-
closure situation is appropriate in some circumstances. The ele-
ment of recovery must be examined in determining under which
circumstances liability is appropriate. It should be emphasized
that the non-privity, nondisclosure situation differs from the
non-privity misstatement situation since a nondisclosure is argu-
ably less offensive than an affirmative misstatement. Further-
more, the non-privity nondisclosure situation is unlike the face-
to-face misstatement and nondisclosure situations in that the
non-privity nondisclosure situation involves potentially massive
liability. Consequently, the appropriate elements of recovery
should be the subject of close scrutiny in order to avoid treating
the nondisclosing defendant unfairly.
B. Elements of Recovery
With respect to the requisite state of mind of the defendant,
the court in Financial Industrial Fund'0 was confronted with the
Mitchell language, which indicated that, in the non-privity mis-
statement situation, the failure of the defendant to exercise due
diligence would be actionable. The court, however, seemed reluc-
tant to impose this standard on the defendant, and turned in-
stead to a consideration of the "business judgment" rule which
bars recovery "for errors or mistakes in judgment. . . when...
[defendants] have used such judgment and have so acted in
good faith."'' Although recognizing that the business judgment
rule was generally applicable only in suits against corporate offi-
cers and directors for mismanagement of the corporation, the
court stated that the same standard should be applied in this case
190, 474 F.2d at 519.
191. Id. at 518. The court may be using two different standards in assessing the
liability of the corporation. It appears that the corporation owes a duty of "due diligence"
in promptly gathering information but only a duty of "good faith" in the timing of the
release. Id. at 521.
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since the "timing of such statement was a matter of discretion." '
The defendant would therefore be exonerated by a showing of
"either good faith or the exercise of good business judgment in its
acts or inaction. '19 The court denied recovery, concluding that
"there was exercised good faith and due diligence" in the timing
of the release.194
The court in Financial Industrial Fund was attempting to
select a standard that would hold the defendant liable only for
conduct more blameworthy than mere negligence. In part, the
court responded to the fact that disclosure problems involve diffi-
cult questions of judgment which are absent from the misstate-
ment situation. In the nondisclosure situation it is necessary for
the defendant to judge the significance of facts involved since
only material facts need be disclosed.195 Such a judgment is not
required in the misstatement situation, since the defendant may
avoid liability by simply telling the truth.
Although it may be appropriate to consider the difficulty of
the judgment involved in selecting the standard of conduct ap-
plicable to the defendant, the imprecise analysis used by the
court in Financial Industrial Fund detracts from an opinion that
is otherwise lucid. First, it is less than clear that there is any dif-
ference between the "business judgment" standard and a due
diligence or negligence standard. Professor Lattin has stated
that it is "doubtful" whether there is any difference between the
reasonable man test and the business judgment rule.191 Even
assuming that a "business judgment" standard is somewhat less
stringent than a negligence standard, the concept as defined by
the court lacks the precision of a "recklessness" standard, which
may, in fact, be the test the court is endorsing. Financial Indus-
trial Fund is therefore an example of a case in which the court
engaged in the type of analysis appropriate in 10b-5 cases. The
court attempted to select a different standard, based on valid
policy reasons, by which to measure the defendant's conduct.
192. Id. at 518.
193. Id. at 521.
194. Id.
195. After recognizing that management must evaluate the significance of the infor-
mation in question, as well as ascertain the details in question with reasonable dispatch,
the court stated: "These factors take us so much farther within the corporate decisional
processes than do misleading statements actually issued." Id. at 518.
196. N. LATTrN, CORPORATIONS 272-74 (2d ed. 1971). See also 3 W. FLErCHER, CYCLOPE-
DIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPOaATIONS 1 § § 1039-40 (1947) (liability for want of ordinary
prudence and skill under the "business judgment" rule).
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If the court in Financial Industrial Fund accepted a standard
that approximates recklessness as the norm for defendant's con-
duct, the decision was correct. As in the non-privity
misstatement situation, the potentially massive liability makes
negligence too stringent a standard by which to measure the de-
fendant's conduct. Moreover, the problem sensed by the court in
Financial Industrial Fund-the difficulty of the disclosure deci-
sion-could be properly handled by the use of recklessness as the
standard for defendant's conduct. The choice of this less stringent
standard would be a concession to the difficulty of the defen-
dant's decision.
Plaintiff's justifiable reliance requirement should be mea-
sured by the same standard used in the non-privity misstatement
situation. Assuming that liability would result only for nondisclo-
sures that were either reckless, knowing, or intentional, the plain-
tiff would be barred from recovery only if his reliance were reck-
less. This standard apparently was not followed in Financial In-
dustrial Fund. In that case the court, relying on Mitchell, ac-
cepted the notion that "plaintiff. . . had the burden of proof to
establish that it exercised due care in making its stock purchase
. .. , The court found that "there was no showing by plain-
tiff of . . . facts to meet the standard of due diligence on its
part."'9 8 Conditioning plaintiffs recovery on a finding that plain-
tiff acted with due care seems inappropriate in light of the fact
that the defendant was apparently held to a lower standard of
care. Such a situation could conceivably result in a negligent
plaintiff being barred from recovery for a defendant's reckless,
knowing or intentional nondisclosure. As stated earlier, this result
would seem intolerable. Once it is decided that a fact pattern is
actionable, loss should generally be allocated to the more blame-
worthy party. 9'
Materiality is the only element that should be defined differ-
ently here than in the non-privity misstatement situation. In the
non-privity nondisclosure situation, a material fact should be de-
fined with reference to a reasonable man standard; that is, any
fact which would affect the investment judgment of a reasonable
man. The use of a recklessness standard (as was suggested in the
non-privity misstatement situation) would not give a defendant
197. 474 F.2d at 521.
198. Id.
199. See text accompanying note 170 supra.
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proper guidance as to what he was expected to disclose since the
decision to disclose requires a judgment of what would be mate-
rial. To define materiality in terms of what may affect the invest-
ment decision of even a reckless investor simply does not give the
defendant a workable test; only the reasonable man standard can
objectively provide proper guidance. Under a recklessness stan-
dard, a corporation would have to disclose virtually every fact
within its knowledge, no matter how trivial, on the basis that an
unreasonable investor might attach importance to it. As a result,
the necessity of making such massive disclosures would create an
intolerable administrative and financial burden on insiders.
When considering the requirement of reliance, the court in
Financial Industrial Fund omitted any discussion of Mills or Ute,
stating that "the plaintiff [has] the burden of broof to establish
that . . . plaintiff relied to its detriment" on the nondisclosure
of the defendant. 21 The court subsequently found that the plain-
tiff had not met this requirement. For the same reasons as were
discussed in the non-privity misstatement section, reliance
should be presumed from a finding of materiality, with the defen-
dant having the opportunity to rebut the presumption by intro-
ducing proof of the plaintiff's non-reliance. 21 This definition of
reliance which has emerged from Mills and Ute seems to offer a
logical approach to handling the problem.0 2
V. CONCLUSION
In this article the author has attempted to formulate the
elements of recovery under rule 10b-5. The basic thesis through-
out has been that the elements should be defined so as to promote
the integrity of the marketplace and to insure fairness among the
parties to a securities transaction. This approach would require
courts to recognize that the promotion of these policies requires
varying elements of recovery according to the fact patterns in-
volved. Moreover, such an approach would insure maximum fair-
200. 474 F.2d at 521.
201. See text accompanying note 183 supra.
202. Courts seem to recognize that there would be no liability for the non-trading
insider who failed to make material disclosures if there existed a valid corporate purpose
for delay in the disclosure. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12
(2d Cir. 1968); Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). This
view was approved in Financial Industrial Fund, the court stating that a prerequisite for
liability was "that there [be] no valid corporate purpose which dictates the information
be not disclosed." 474 F.2d at 519.
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ness, promote the integrity of the securities markets and steadily
increase predictability, as a rational body of law evolves govern-
ing the elements of recovery under 10b-5.
Although this author is convinced that his particular defini-
tion of the elements of recovery is the most rational, the accept-
ance of the definition is not as important as is the acceptance of
the overall approach advocated by this paper. To accept the
premise that the elements of recovery are interdependent and
that their definition should promote fairness and protect the in-
tegrity of the market would be a significant advance in bringing
order to one area of 10b-5 litigation. It would at least provide an
understandable and rational framework in which to analyze 10b-
5 problems.
Finally, it should be noted that a Ninth Circuit case has ac-
cepted an approach to 10b-5 not unlike that advocated in this
article. In White v. Abrams203 the court was faced with a claim
that material misstatements and nondisclosures had occurred in
connection with stock purchases by White. Apparently relying on
Ellis v. Carter"' and Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith,"5 the
district court had instructed the jury the defendant would be
liable under 10b-5 for any material misstatement he made in
connection with the sale of the securities, "even if. . .defendant
did not know the falsity of the misrepresentation he made to
plaintiffs." In holding this instruction to be improper, the court
addressed itself to what state of mind the defendant must have
in order to be liable under 10b-5. The court specifically rejected
the notion that the state of mind necessary for recovery under
10b-5 must be the same in all fact patterns. Rather, the court
advocated a flexible approach to the definition of the requisite
state of mind of the defendant, stating:
We believe that the cases and commentators demonstrate that
any attempt to limit the scope of duty in all 10b-5 cases by the
use of one standard for state of mind or scienter is confusing and
unworkable. 3'
The White court further noted that, in selecting the applicable
state of mind requirement, "the court should focus on the goals
of the securities fraud legislation by considering a number of
203. 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
204. 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
205. 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962).
206. 495 F.2d at 734.
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factors that have been found to be significant in securities
transactions.1
20
1
Although there are some problems with the opinion in White
v. Abrams,211 the attitude it reflects is admirable. The factors
explicated by the court as important in the selection of the appro-
priate state of mind seem to express a concern with promoting
fairness among the parties and the integrity of the securities mar-
ket.209 This approach is a needed change in the analysis of the
elements of recovery under rule 10b-5.
207. Id. at 735.
208. One glaring problem is that the district court was instructed merely to advise
the jury on the factors which are to be considered in selecting the defendant's state of
mind. The jury is then to find liability or non-liability. Id. The problem is that by allowing
each jury to select the appropriate standard in each case, predictability disappears and
inconsistent results will follow.
209. The court specifically stated that in making the determination of the requisite
state of mind, "the court should focus on the goals of the securities fraud legislation
.... " The court went on to urge the consideration, inter alia of "the relationship of the
defendant to the plaintiff, the defendant's access to the information as compared to the
plaintiff's access, the benefit that the defendant derives from the relationship, the defen-
dant's awareness of whether the plaintiff was relying upon their relationship in making
his investment decisions and the defendant's activity in initiating the securities transac-
tion in question." Id. at 735-36.
